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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Jackman, Nicholas. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2018. 
Chinese Satellite Diplomacy: China’s Strategic Weapon for Soft and Hard Power Gains 
  
 
 
China signed its first turn-key communication satellite contract with Nigeria in 2004. The 
contract stipulated that China would design, build, integrate, launch, and complete in-orbit 
checkout for the Nigcomsat-1 communication satellite and then transfer control over to Nigeria. 
By 2018, China had contracted and launched another six communication satellites for various 
foreign customers. The customers, who are foreign governments, are geographically dispersed 
throughout South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. The satellite sales have occurred during 
China’s unprecedented economic growth, a time in which China has been granted additional 
foreign policy options as its power increases relative to others. This thesis utilizes lateral 
pressure theory to suggest that China has strategically signed contracts with foreign governments 
for the sale of communication satellites to further its foreign policy objectives. Examination of 
China’s space history, its foreign policy goals, and key variables shed light on China’s intentions 
and possible future actions.  
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Chapter 1: China’s Foreign Policy and Space Program 
 
China has evolved into a leading global space player and continues to design, build, 
integrate, launch, and complete in-orbit checkout of communication satellites (COMSATs) and 
remote-sensing satellites for foreign customers.
1
 As of January 2018, China had successfully 
exported seven COMSATs and two remote sensing satellites to foreign government customers 
around the globe and currently has at least two contracts signed for future in-orbit deliveries of 
COMSATs and remote sensing satellites. The first satellite agreement was for the purchase and 
delivery of Nigcomsat-1, a COMSAT for Nigeria. The satellite agreement was signed in 2004 
and the satellite was launched in 2007. Since Nigcomsat-1, China has continued to market its 
satellites to international customers and the sales have increased. Purchasing countries are not 
limited to a single geographic region; rather, they are scattered throughout Central and South 
America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. Since 2004, this is a relatively new phenomenon, and one 
that demands our attention.  
 While much has been written about China’s future global intentions, little analytic effort 
has been dedicated to understanding China’s strategic motivations and reasons for engaging in 
such satellite sales, particularly how and why those customers are selected. Does China simply 
want to guarantee access to cheap natural resources?  Initial research suggests China’s leaders 
sign favorable deals with resource rich countries as a means to secure access and rights to other 
                                                          
1
 A communications satellite (COMSAT) is an expensive radio-frequency (RF) repeater in space. The satellite’s 
purpose is to receive, translate, and retransmit signals between users on earth. An RF signal is very weak after 
traveling 22,500 miles to the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) belt, the orbit around the Earth’s equator. This 
requires the satellite to amplify the signal and transmit the signal at lower frequency and a different polarization. The 
separation in frequency and polarization isolates the transmitted RF signal to avoid injecting interference into the 
signal. COMSATs are most commonly used for satellite television broadcasts, very small aperture terminal 
networks (VSATs) communication networks, and mobile communications. 
2 
 
markets.
2
 This answer is insufficient; however, China’s satellite diplomacy almost certainly 
meets a specific Chinese policy goal and serves a larger objective than making a sale to earn a 
wage or to hope for access to foreign natural resources. China very likely leverages foreign 
satellite sales as a means to exercise both hard and soft power abroad. The research question in 
this thesis, at its most basic level, is: to what ends do Chinese satellite sales serve to further 
China’s foreign policy agenda? How do these sales advance China’s foreign policy objectives? 
Beijing’s leaders will almost certainly continue to sign satellite agreements to foreign customers 
in the future, so understanding these ideas will support a greater understanding of Chinese 
aspirations abroad, especially foreign satellite sales. 
Realist assumptions and Lateral Pressure Theory 
 
Realism is the most applicable theory underpinning China’s satellite sales. Realist 
assumptions and system level theories have great explanatory power for this research question. 
Levy conducts a review of the major theories used by international relations scholars. Levy 
expounds on Morgenthau’s realist assumptions.
 3
 First, the international system is anarchic and 
states are the primary actors. Second, states are rational unitary actors with well-defined 
interests. Third, state interests are dominated by security and power is a zero sum game. A state’s 
gain is at the expense of other states. These assumptions are readily accepted by realist scholars. 
Levy describes the central proposition of realist theory is “the distribution of power in the system 
determines the behavior of individual states within the system.”
4
 This is essential to China’s rise. 
                                                          
2
 Tiezzi, Shannon. 2013. “China's Space Diplomacy.” The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-space-
diplomacy/ (October 5, 2017). 
3
 Levy, Jack S. “Theories and Causes of War.” The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. pg. 224-225.  
4
 Ibid. 
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As China’s power increases relative to others, China is afforded a greater number of behaviors 
and options.  
The most appropriate system level theory within realism is lateral pressure theory, 
developed by Choucri and North in 1975. “Lateral pressure refers to any tendency (or 
propensity) of individuals and societies to expand their activities and exert influence and control 
beyond their established boundaries, whether for economic, political, military, scientific, 
religious, or other purposes.”
5
 Choucri explains that lateral pressure theory is about relationships 
between a state’s characteristics and its international behavior. A state that expands its activities 
beyond its own boundaries is driven by a number of capabilities and motivation; and often, said 
state will encounter other states also being pushed outward for a number of its own reasons. 
Where the motivations and spheres of influence of each outwardly expanding state intersect is 
where future conflict will arise, according to lateral pressure theory. Choucri and North suggest 
“the strength of a country's lateral pressure correlates positively with its capabilities and power.”
6
 
Lateral pressure theory, as described by Levy, suggests a state’s “increasing population 
and advancing technology generate increasing domestic demands for resources, demands that 
cannot generally be satisfied by a state’s domestic resource endowments or by existing levels of 
foreign trade.”
7
 As a result, the resource demands generate ‘lateral pressure’ for access to 
markets and political control elsewhere. The push to move beyond a state’s borders and into 
other foreign markets generates an increase in military spending and alliance formations. 
According to this theory, expansionist ventures will likely lead the state to encounter conflicts 
with other foreign actors because they will react to the increased foreign ventures with their own 
                                                          
5
 Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. 2016. The Theory of Lateral Pressure Highlights of Quantification & Empirical 
Analysis. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2859712. Pg. 3.  
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Levy, J. op. cit., pg. 258. 
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set of countering actions.  Lateral pressure theory is contested by others, who suggest the original 
analysis that generated the theory was flawed. Zuk argues that Choucri and North did not 
adequately factor in resource access into their test, despite arguing that resources are the major 
catalyst for outward expansion.
8
 
 Lateral pressure theory also relates to China’s use of satellite sales and its One Belt, One 
Road initiative, seen as the centerpiece of Xi Jingping’s foreign policy.
9
 One thought put forward 
by Tiezzi is China seeks to create satellite deals with resource rich countries.
10
 This notion is 
supported by lateral pressure theory. Satellite deals are signed with resource rich states, so China 
would be attempting to guarantee access to those materials through the sale. Following this 
theory, one could reasonably expect China to continue the sale of satellites to foreign partners as 
its power continues to increase relative to others. Access to political control of external 
populations directly ties into China’s use of soft power and public diplomacy.  
Soft and Hard Power Defined 
 
When considering states’ foreign policy objectives, an adequate understanding of each 
form of power is required. Some contend that power has two primary components: hard power 
and soft power. The two different types of power are used to achieve different foreign policy 
goals and each has different and lasting effects.  
                                                          
8
 Zuk, Gary. 1985. “National Growth and International Conflict: A Reevaluation of Choucri and Norths Thesis.” The 
Journal of Politics 47(1): pg. 269–81. 
9
 McBride, James. 2015. “Building the New Silk Road.” Council on Foreign Relations. 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/building-new-silk-road (February 4, 2018). 
10
 Tiezzi, Shannon. 2013. “China's Space Diplomacy.” The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-space-
diplomacy/ (October 5, 2017). 
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“Soft power” is a concept coined by Joseph Nye in 1990.
11
 Nye describes soft power as 
“getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.”
12
 
Nye describes how soft power is different from influence. He suggests “influence can also rest 
on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the 
ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. Simply put, in 
behavioral terms soft power is “attractive power.” In terms of resources, soft-power resources are 
the assets that produce such attraction.”
13
 The concept has been widely debated since its 
introduction; however, Hook uses the definition provided by Joseph Nye and describes soft 
power as “the expression of its political values and cultural dynamism in ways that other 
societies and governments may find appealing.”
14
 Soft power suggests a state is an idea in and of 
itself that attracts others to said state. This concept is often associated with the United States; 
however, the term can also apply to other states and can affect their foreign policy. Much of the 
discussion on soft power is US centric. Many argue about the impact and effectiveness of soft 
power. Some believe the concept is an effective extension of a state’s power and others believe 
the concept is outright worthless.  
Patalakh and Blechman have responded to Nye’s concept and evaluated the usefulness of 
the term.  Blechman is critical of soft power. According to Blechman, soft power has inherent 
limitations.
15
 He suggests soft power cannot be deployed in specific foreign policy situations or 
be controlled and shaped in a meaningful way by the US government. Blechman agrees that soft 
power is a contributing factor to foreign policy success, but that other sources of hard power will 
                                                          
11
 Nye, Joseph S. 1990. Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power. New York: Basic Books. 
12
 Nye, Joseph S. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. Pg. 5.  
13
 Nye, op cit., pg. 6.  
14
 Hook, Steven W. 2008. US Foreign Policy: the Paradox of World Power. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Pg. 9.  
15
 Blechman, Barry M. 2004. “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics by Joseph S. Nye.” Political 
Science Quarterly 119(4): 680–81. 
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continue to be the dominant form of power. Patalakh discusses how the concept has evolved 
since its initial conception in 1990. Patalakh suggests the most narrow understanding of soft 
power is “the power of attractiveness, a capability to get others to want what you want.”
16
 He 
continues by putting forth the main issues and concerns with soft power. First, it is not 
government controlled. Second, it is hard to measure its effectiveness. Third, it is very difficult 
to measure and quantify. Since soft power is dependent on the recipient, the impact of soft power 
will vary greatly from state actor to state actor. Patalakh suggests some have discarded the 
concept as a whole, but the notion that improving your international reputation likely leads to 
better expected outcomes is logically consistent.
17
   
Much of the discussion on soft power has been dominated by the US, as the term was 
coined during US primacy in the international system. The term was a means to explain US 
power abroad and, as a result, most soft power discussion has been US centric. The US has 
structures and freedoms that inherently limit the impact of soft power. China, on the other hand, 
can likely control its strategic state messaging much more effectively than the US, since China’s 
state power is more centralized than in the US. This, on the surface, suggests China would likely 
be able to manipulate soft power in a way the US could not. Patalakh discusses how Nye 
mentioned four mechanisms for transmitting soft power: public diplomacy, broadcasting, 
exchanges, and assistance.
18
 The Chinese government has much more control over those 
channels for transmitting soft power than the US. So even though it is acknowledged that soft 
power can take time, China might be able to accelerate that timeline. The common theme among 
those analyzing soft power is that analysts understand its utility, but also acknowledge its 
                                                          
16
 Patalakh, Artem. 2016. “Assessment of Soft Power Strategies: Towards an Aggregative Analytical Model for 
Country-Focused Case Study Research.” Croatian International Relations Review 22(76). pg. 88. 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Patalakh, op. cit., pg. 97.  
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limitations. Soft power cannot be deployed to solve a specific policy issue, even if its 
aggregation over time benefits the state. Lastly, soft power is not controlled by the state, but the 
‘client’ who is on the receiving end.  
Hard power is described by Campbell as “the application of military power to meet 
national ends- that is, the deployment of ground troops, naval assets, and precision munitions to 
secure a vital national objective.”
19
 The definition by some has come to include an economic 
element, but at its core it is understood as the capacity of state “A gets B to do something that it 
would not otherwise do.”
20
 This logic leads to another prevailing theme between hard and soft 
power: soft power is co-optive and hard power is coercive. Wilson provides a very similar 
definition of hard power, but expands upon the definition by providing means to deliver said 
power. Wilson suggests hard power “strategies focus on military intervention, coercive 
diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interests.”
21
 The prevailing theme 
between readings on hard power is unanimous: hard power is coercive.  
 Hard power is generally considered tangible. One can measure a state’s total economic 
output or create a military order of battle. China’s satellite sales, and the economic incentives 
that come with the sales, would be a tool of hard power. The hard power tools grant China more 
influence, but as Nye noted, influence is not akin to soft power. In this study, the soft power 
component will likely take priority over hard power. Public diplomacy has increasingly become 
the focus of the Chinese government. Chinese public diplomacy is attempting to “redress the so-
                                                          
19
 Campbell, Kurt M., and Michael E. OHanlon. 2006. Hard power: the new politics of national security. New York: 
Basic Books. pg. 7.  
20
 Bilgin, Pinar, and Elis Berivan. 2008. “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis.” 
Insight Turkey 10(2): pg. 5–20. 
21
 Wilson, Ernest J. "Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 616 (2008): 110-24. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu/stable/25097997. 
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called Chinese threat, and make the world accept the rise of Chinese power.”
22
 Despite not being 
coercive in nature, I would argue satellite sales are an extension of China’s hard power. The 
satellite sale and economic incentives are both tangible and measureable – with both being 
extensions of China’s power sources (economy and military). 
Chinese Governmental Structure 
 
 China is an authoritarian single-party communist state, described by the CIA World 
Factbook as “a system of government in which the state plans and controls the economy and a 
single - often authoritarian - party holds power.” 
23
 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
governed China since 1949, when the Red Army declared victory in the Chinese Civil War over 
the Nationalist Party (or Kuomintang) following the conclusion of World War II.
24
 The CCP 
attempts to maintain tight control over China’s citizens and exhibits several characteristics of 
single-party authoritarian regimes described by Geddes. According to Geddes, single-party 
authoritarian regimes are the most likely authoritarian regime types to endure (when compared to 
personalist and military authoritarian regimes), are more likely to weather the death of a leader or 
founder, are more likely to be open to loyal citizens, and are less susceptible to endogenous 
sources of instability.
25
 Many of Geddes’ claims about single-party authoritarian states apply to 
the CCP. In this sense, China and the CCP are no different from other authoritarian states. In 
                                                          
22 Wang, Yiwei. "Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power." The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 257-73. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu/stable/25098003. 
23
 “References :: Definitions and Notes.” Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html (October 3, 2017).  
“The World Factbook: CHINA.” 2017. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ch.html (October 3, 2017).  
24
 “The Chinese Revolution of 1949.” U.S. Department of State. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-
1952/chinese-rev (October 3, 2017). 
25
 Geddes, Barbara. 1999. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” Annual Review of 
Political Science 2(1): 115–44. 
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recent years, Chinese leadership has sought to increase loyalties to the CCP as a means to ensure 
party survival.  
 Xi Jinping, the current General Secretary of the CCP and the President of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), assumed the top leadership position of the CCP in November 2012. 
One of his most prominent campaigns, part of his “China Dream,” is the crackdown on 
corruption within the CCP. The Chinese Dream is Xi’s “vision of a stronger nation based on the 
Chinese path, the Chinese spirit, and Chinese strength.”
26
 By purging the CCP of more than a 
hundred thousand corrupt officials, Xi intended to restore and reestablish the mission of the CCP 
to Chinese citizens.
27
 Overall, Xi sought to increase loyalty to the party over other interests – a 
critical component of his China Dream. Xi determined loyalty to the CCP was of paramount 
importance, since his analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union determined Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, relaxed 
political control of the Soviet society before the country experienced economic reform.
28
 This 
resulted in loyalties to parties other than the Soviet Communist party, and a failure of the state to 
adequately defend the communist party when defense was required. Xi wishes to avoid a similar 
fate. The cleansing of corrupt officials has an added bonus: it consolidates Xi’s power within the 
CCP and rids the party of many potential rivals that may challenge Xi in the future.
29
 As a result, 
Xi, as the leader of CCP, has virtual control over all foreign policy decisions within China.   
 
                                                          
26
 “Profile: China's President Xi Jinping.” 2017. BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11551399 
(February 4, 2018). 
27
 Allison, Graham. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourts. Pg. 116.  
28
 Allison, op. cit., pg. 119. 
29
 Osnos, Evan. 2017. “Rise of the Red Prince.” The New Yorker. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red (February 4, 2018). 
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Views of Chinese Foreign Policy Goals 
 
Chinese foreign policy has been written about in length by Sutter, Handberg, Pillsbury, 
Christensen, and Kerr, among others. There are two distinct groups of scholars who analyze 
Chinese motivations. The first, exemplified by Pillsbury, contends that Chinese foreign policy 
goals are sinister in nature and China is motivated to become the leading superpower in Asian 
and world affairs. If achieved, this will produce a dramatically different reality than the one we 
currently experience. The second view, represented by Sutter, suggests that China is primarily 
driven by economic growth and stability at home, and that China is following the route of 
previous rising powers. Neither set of motivations fully realize Chinese foreign actions, and 
China almost certainly combines elements of each set. The motivations result in different 
outcomes and provide different explanations for Chinese actions.  
According to Pillsbury, China’s current strategy has nine principle elements. These 
elements, if correctly followed, will allow China to ultimately become the preponderant regional 
power broker in Asian and global affairs. Pillsbury’s stratagems are derived from Chinese texts 
that date back to China’s ‘Warring States’ period and are considered the “manual for 
statecraft.”
30
 The nine elements, loosely summarized, describe how China should act to supplant 
the current hegemon (Table 1). The elements are not fact, but rather Pillsbury’s analysis of 
historical Chinese texts. These elements, while useful to this analysis, can be debated, but 
nonetheless they provide a useful launching point for analysis of China’s strategic intentions.  
 
 
                                                          
30
 Pillsbury, Michael. 2015. The hundred-Year marathon: Chinas secret strategy to replace America as the global 
superpower. New York, NY: Griffin. Pg. 34-46. 
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Table 1. Nine Elements of Statecraft (Pillsbury, 2015) 
Statecraft Elements Characteristics 
Induce complacency to avoid alerting your 
opponent 
Mask your true intentions until the perfect 
opportunity, premature provocation can prove to 
be disastrous 
Manipulate your opponent’s advisers This attempts to “turn the opponent’s house in on 
itself” 
Be patient – for decades, or longer – to 
achieve victory 
In the Warring States period (475-221 BC), 
victory was only sometimes achievable after 
decades – this is no different 
Steal your opponent’s ideas and technology 
for strategic purposes 
Theft for strategic gain 
Military might is not the critical factor for 
winning long term competition 
Economic power is the key to long-term success, 
collapse of USSR proves this 
Recognize that the hegemon will take 
extreme, even reckless action to retain its 
dominant position 
Expect the US to become emboldened as their 
power relative to China fades 
Never lose sight of Shi Deceiving others into doing your preferred 
actions, and maximizing opportunity 
Establish and employ metrics for measuring 
your status relative to other potential 
challengers 
Measure power during peace and war – across all 
dimensions, not just military 
Always be vigilant to avoid being encircled 
or deceived by others 
China’s greatest strategic fear is encirclement  
   
Pillsbury stresses China’s desire to become a primary power broker in an eventual 
Chinese-led world order. By using the same stratagems that Chinese emperors used in the 
Warring States years, China can quietly achieve its goals over the course of several decades. He 
forecasts a world that looks much different than now, in which Chinese values replace American 
values. Individual rights are stripped and human rights activists are constantly under attack; free 
speech will be censored, and China will continue to oppose democratization.
31
 Most importantly, 
Pillsbury suggests that China will continue to ally with American adversaries to pursue agendas 
contrary to US interests.
32
 
                                                          
31
 Pillsbury, op. cit., pg. 179-180.  
32
 Pillsbury, op. cit., pg. 183.  
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Allison describes a less sinister Chinese foreign policy vision, that could take decades to 
achieve, if not longer, but ultimately ends with Chinese primacy in Asian and global affairs. 
Allison describes four overarching objectives for Beijing.
33
 First, China returns as the 
preponderant power in Asian affairs. Second, China reestablishes control over “territories of 
‘greater China’” (to include Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan).
34
 Third, China will seek 
to recover “its historic spheres of influence along its borders and in the adjacent seas so that 
others give it the deference great nations have always demanded.”
35
 Fourth, China will command 
global respect from other states and great powers. Allison later describes actions that China, and 
more specifically Xi Jinping, is currently undertaking to help reach its overarching objectives.
36
 
Xi is aggressively cleansing the CCP of corruption and revitalizing the party, reviving Chinese 
nationalism, attempting to engineer a third economic revolution, and restructuring the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA). 
Sutter suggests China’s foreign policy motivations in the 21
st
 century revolve around two 
key domestic issues: a focus on domestic stability and economic growth.
37
 This is a stark contrast 
to the steadfast realist views of Pillsbury and Allison. Sutter describes Chinese leaders that are 
acutely aware that an international crisis can negatively impact the success of economic 
modernization or the public faiths and loyalties instilled in the CCP. As such, equal priority is 
granted to domestic issues and foreign issues alike, since the two are inextricably linked. 
Following the end of the Cold War, China came to view the US as both its primary threat and its 
most important partner. As China’s economic and military capabilities continue to grow, Beijing 
                                                          
33
 Allison, G. op. cit., pg. 109.  
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Allison, G. op. cit., pg. 116-117. 
37
 Sutter, Robert G. 2016. Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War. Lanham, UK: Rowan 
& Littlefield. pg. 27.  
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increasingly viewed the international system to be moving away from unipolar dominance 
towards a multipolar world. This perception led Chinese leadership to be more assertive in their 
foreign policy objectives. The more assertive actions led to increased tensions between China 
and other East and Southeast Asian countries. The increased tensions did not yield fruitful results 
or results that were in China’s best interests. As such, China moved away from its more assertive 
approach and began a more accommodating and moderate approach until conditions are more 
favorable to Chinese actions.
38
 China reaffirmed its peaceful development policy after the 
unsuccessful foreign policy ventures paved the way for more assertive Chinese soft power 
pursuits.  
Kurlantzick also described Chinese foreign policy differently from both Pillsbury and 
Allison.
39
 Kurlantzick asserts that China’s coining of the term ‘peaceful rise’, later to be called 
‘peaceful development’ was part of a Chinese foreign policy objective that showed China’s rise 
would not be at the expense of other nations. This objective would allow China to build its 
economic power and avoid the fate of the Soviet Union all the while presenting the image of a 
benign international actor. Peace and stability are essential to China’s rise, since Chinese markets 
demand stable trading partners for imported products. By 2007, China was positioned to become 
the largest consumer of oil and was already the largest consumer of copper, platinum, iron ore, 
aluminum, and badly needed timber. A growing economy only exacerbates the market demands.  
Christensen’s thoughts somewhat echo Kurlantzick’s view. Christensen believes China’s 
rise is different than previous great powers that ascended to global primacy. First, Christensen 
contends that the forces of globalization will limit China’s military ventures in Southeast Asia 
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since states are now more economically connected than before. Second, the international 
institutions created by the US following their rise to global primacy benefitted China and others, 
not just the US. Third, China is a rising nuclear power in a world where other nuclear powers 
exist.
40
 
The multiple views held by scholars on China’s foreign policy illustrate diversity of 
thought on China’s priorities and intentions, but all agree on China’s objectives. China almost 
certainly seeks to achieve continued economic growth and eventually unify China’s disputed 
territories under CCP government sovereignty. This is all the while granting China more power 
relative to other global actors – giving China a more assertive global role.   
China’s Foreign Policy Goals 
 
 China has mixed foreign policy motivations that cannot be explained fully by a single 
author. Instead, I offer a blended motivation and set of foreign policy objectives. International 
relation theories exist to clarify and forecast the actions a state actor will take at the global scale 
and according to realist assumptions, China will acquire additional foreign policy options in the 
future. The “central proposition of realist theory is that the distribution of power in the system 
determines the behavior of individual states within the system.”
41
 This is essential to China’s 
rise. As China’s power increases relative to others, particularly the United States, the 
preponderant power broker in the current international system, China is afforded a greater 
number of behaviors and options. Under this assumption, China’s foreign policy positions and 
goals are expected to become loftier and increasingly assertive in the coming years as its sources 
of power continue to grow. China will continue to act in its best interests (which are often 
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counter to US interests) and compete with the US on a range of foreign policy issues and 
objectives. Therefore, China has several overarching foreign policy objectives. These policies are 
centered on economic growth and domestic stability, territorial reunification, and achieving 
regional and global power status on par with the US.  
 China will continue to place emphasis on economic growth and domestic stability. This 
supports the ‘peaceful development’ idea and masks true intentions until the perfect 
opportunity, as outlined in China’s manual for statecraft.
42
 The Chinese state has stood 
the test of time. It is the oldest civilization in the world. China has existed. China exists. 
China will continue to exist. China will not cease to exist. Under this condition it is 
entirely acceptable for China’s peaceful development to take decades or centuries to 
materialize and come to fruition. By placing economic development as the top priority, 
China will avoid the fate of the Soviet Union and the CCP will retain the support of the 
people. A strong economic core will allow China’s elite to continue to be legitimized and 
grant China increased influence abroad. Economic growth ensures the CCP survival, 
which is ultimately the number one priority of PRC leadership.   
 As China’s economic power continues to grow, China is afforded additional foreign 
policy influence and options. This, coupled with a modernized PLA and an increasingly 
technologically sophisticated society, will position China as the primary regional power 
broker in Southeast Asian affairs. The economic and military capabilities will provide 
China with a suite of carrots and sticks to persuade or dissuade rivals and affect its 
adversaries’ foreign policy calculus. China will almost certainly experience an economic 
slowdown at some point in the future. At this time, China’s leaders will almost certainly 
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control the narrative and shape the story in a fashion that is favorable to the CCP. The 
economic slowdown, relative to double digit annual growth, will likely come as China 
pivots from an export based economy to one that is dependent on domestic consumption.  
 At some point, China will be forced to reconcile with nationalist cries for the territorial 
unification of Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, Chinese claims of sovereignty in the South 
China Sea, East China Sea, Yellow Sea, and disputed claims regarding India.
43
 Territorial 
reunification is considered an overarching objective that all Chinese leaders share. China 
might attempt to wait out its adversaries until reunification is all but unavoidable, but it is 
also possible China could attempt to reunify as a means to distract the Chinese population 
should Beijing suffer a significant economic slowdown.  
 According to Pillsbury, China’s foreign policy objectives regularly run counter to US 
interests. Johnston agrees with Pillsbury and argues that Beijing leaders have often had views 
and interests that are opposed to US views and interests. Johnston cites specific examples of 
“Chinese assertiveness” prior to 2010, like the EP-3 incident or PLA missile exercises in 1995-
96 along the Taiwan Strait.
44
 Johnston argues that China’s current anti-US policy positions are 
not new phenomena, but rather a continuation of past foreign policy habits and “there is no 
obvious pattern of new assertiveness” by China against the US.
45
 Critics of Johnston’s work 
suggest his definition of assertiveness is too narrow. Chen defines assertiveness in three ways: 
offensive assertiveness, defensive assertiveness, and constructive assertiveness.
46
 Chen argues 
that Beijing leaders maintain past positions of defensive and constructive assertiveness, but there 
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is no evidence of an increased effort of Chinese offensive assertiveness, which Chen describes as 
“a great power’s use of coercion to expand its interest and influence without provocation from 
other countries.”
47
  Ultimately, Chen agrees with Johnston in that China is no more aggressive 
than it has previously been, but Chen also provides a more thorough definition of assertiveness 
than was provided by Johnston. Realist assumptions suggest power is a zero-sum game; China’s 
gain is at the expense of the US, and vice versa. By opposing US foreign policy objectives and 
limiting US gains in Asian affairs, China can reject some degree of US encirclement – a key 
component in China’s manual for statecraft. As China continues its rise to great power status, we 
can reasonably expect China to increase its offensive assertiveness – which would be a change 
from the current status quo. 
 China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative is how China seeks to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives. The initiative, unveiled by Xi Jinping in 2013, is China’s attempt to create a modern 
day version of the ancient ‘Silk Road’ and connect Asia, Europe, and Africa through investments 
in trade through a network of pipelines, ports, and telecommunication infrastructure. The original 
Silk Road existed during China’s Han dynasty (206 BC – 220 CE), some 2000 years ago, and 
was China’s push westward via trade routes through central Asia and, at its height, Europe.  The 
Silk Road was an avenue for Chinese goods to access foreign markets. Similarly, the modern day 
Silk Road is a means for Chinese leaders to export excess goods and industrial capacity to access 
central Asian markets – while posturing and executing a more assertive foreign policy (see figure 
1 for China’s proposed Silk Roads).
48
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Figure 1. China’s Proposed New Silk Roads
49
 
 China is providing substantial funds to the One Belt, One Road initiative. Reports of the 
actual value of the initiative vary, but all are in agreement that China is pouring significant 
amounts of funding into the project. According to the New York Times, China is “promising 
more than $1 trillion in infrastructure and spanning more than 60 countries.”
50
 And according to 
Chinese press, the total investment in the project may exceed $4-8 trillion.
51
 The funds will be 
used for a number of infrastructure projects: roads, railroads, pipelines, telecommunication 
services, etc; and the One Belt, One Road countries are a means for surplus Chinese goods to 
access foreign markets. The initiative is likely serving multiple foreign policy objectives. First, 
the initiative supports China’s continued economic growth at home. Economic growth goes hand 
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in hand with domestic stability. Second, it is a means for China to improve its image abroad. 
China building roads and aiding the development of poorer states give credence to the notion that 
China is attempting a peaceful rise and is acting as a responsible international stakeholder. Third, 
a Chinese gain in any of the One Belt, One Road countries is at the expense of the US and other 
western powers.
52
  
 China has used its One Belt, One Road initiative as a springboard into other regions not 
initially included in its foreign policy plans. The original Belt and Road plans focused primarily 
on connecting Asian, African, and European markets, but it has expanded to include Latin 
American and Polar regions. Latin American states were invited to join the One Belt, One Road 
initiative at the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in January 2018. 
The invitation lacked specifics, but it would likely include Chinese funded infrastructure projects 
that improved connectivity.
53
 China is also pursuing its Polar Silk Road. The Polar Silk Road 
would open new artic shipping routes to deliver Chinese goods to foreign markets. Polar 
shipping routes would trim nearly 20 days off of the traditional transit time through the Suez 
Canal.
54
 China’s 2018 Arctic policy white paper actively calls for stronger international 
cooperation for the operation of Artic Sea routes and for all parties to adhere to and act in 
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accordance with international law. China’s expansion of its One Belt, One Road will likely 
continue to challenge US foreign policy interests as its scope increases.
55
  
Foreign Policy Formulation 
 
 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is charged with handling diplomatic affairs 
between China and other states and executing tasks given by the Communist Party’s Central 
Committee and the State Council.
56
 MOFA does not have much say in the foreign policy of 
China; rather it is the mechanism within China to implement foreign policy goals and objectives 
that are created by the Central Committee (especially by the Politburo Standing Committee 
(PSC)). The seven member PSC is China’s most senior decision making body and is the entity 
within China that manages all the consequential foreign policy decisions. The PSC responds to 
international crises or emergencies and is chaired by Xi Jinping (Xi is also the only member of 
the PSC that explicitly has foreign policy responsibilities). If a foreign policy decision is far 
reaching with potentially drastic effects, then the issues can be taken up with the twenty-five 
member Politburo, though this infrequently occurs. A significant change in strategic foreign 
policy direction also requires consent from the 205 member Central Committee, but rarely does 
the Central Committee challenge decisions made by the PSC and Politburo.
57
 
 China’s foreign policy is also influenced by the presence of Leading Small Groups 
(LSGs). A LSG is essentially a committee that is created to support and advise Chinese leaders 
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on an important issue or interest. A LSG can exist for a variety of issues, but the importance of a 
LSG is derived from the most senior individual within the LSG and the rank of the body that 
directed the creation of the LSG. Foreign policy related LSGs are attached to the Central 
Committee and report directly to the PSC. They are also always headed by the General Secretary 
(Xi Jinping), meaning they are the most powerful LSGs within China and provide another 
mechanism for Xi to direct foreign policy within China.
58
 The structures within China’s political 
system and the CCP give President Xi vast foreign policy responsibilities.  
China’s Space Program 
 
 Mao Zedong officially started China’s space program by launching the 5
th
 Research 
Academy of the Ministry of National Defense October 8
th
, 1956. China did not launch its first 
satellite until April 24
th
, 1970, some 14 years after China’s space program’s inception, but since 
then, the program has seen dramatic growth in both on-orbit capability and total number of 
operational satellites. China is now one of the world’s leading space powers, having conducted 
21 successful space launches in 2016 and 19 in 2015. The US, in comparison, only had 22 
successful launches in 2016 while the Russians had 16.
59
 China’s latest space white paper (2016) 
reaffirms Beijing’s dedication to conducting space missions in support of China’s overall 
development strategy and positions the space program to be a critical component of China’s 
foreign policy strategy going forward.  
 The first Chinese satellite, DongFangHong-1, launched in April 1970, marked China as 
just the fifth country in the world to independently launch a satellite into orbit.
60
 The satellite 
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was the heaviest first satellite a country had launched, weighing approximately 173kg (compared 
to the Soviet Sputnik at 84 kg and the US Explorer 1 at 14kg). The successful launch of 
DongFangHong-1 (‘The East is Red’) into low Earth orbit (LEO) triggered parades throughout 
Beijing and across China.
61
 The Chinese boasted about how China was able to achieve this space 
launch through its own merits, without any aid, as self-sufficiency had long been important 
(especially since the Soviet withdrawal in 1956). At the time of launch, China had been 
experiencing a dire economic situation. Mao leveraged the successful launch as a propaganda 
tool to demonstrate what his leadership had achieved. It was a tangible success that placed China 
with other major global powers. The name of the satellite itself was a propaganda tool, inspired 
by the Maoist saying “East wind prevails over the West wind.” This was a metaphor, suggesting 
China and socialism will prevail over western nations and imperialism. From its beginnings, 
Chinese leaders sought to politicize the space program as a means to legitimize the CCP.
62
  
 Chinese leaders realized the political potential of its space program following the 
DongFangHong-1. China sought to follow up the first success with additional spacecraft. The 
Shi Jian 1 (‘practice 1’) launched March 3
rd
, 1971 into LEO and had a total satellite mass of 
221kg.
63
 The satellite was a modified DongFangHong satellite and utilized nickel-cadmium 
rechargeable batteries with solar cells. The broadcast payload was swapped out for three 
scientific instruments: an 11mm cosmic ray detector, a 3mm X-ray detector, and a 
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magnetometer. The satellite transmitted its findings through four shortwave antennas on 16 
channels. The satellite was almost a failure, as it failed to completely separate from its booster, 
but after eight days on orbit, the spacecraft separated for unknown reasons. The satellite executed 
its mission for over 8 years, operating well beyond its designed service life, and verified 
rechargeable batteries with solar cells as a proven capability. The satellite re-entered Earth’s 
atmosphere on June 17
th
, 1979.
64
 
 Following the death of Mao in September of 1976, Deng Xiaoping consolidated 
leadership of China and in 1978 declared that China would not participate in the Space Race. As 
a result, funding for the Chinese Space Program was cut dramatically. Deng believed China’s 
needs as a developing country took higher priority than a space program. Despite this 
declaration, Deng announced four modernizations to take place within China later that yewar. 
The modernizations welcomed foreign investment and opened China’s economy. One of the four 
modernizations was science and military technology. The space industry in China was affected 
by these modernizations and China sought to increase quality control standards. China then 
joined international space organizations including the International Telecommunications 
Organization and the UN committee on the peaceful uses of outer space in the early 1980s. The 
modernizations ended China’s isolation from the global space community and opened up forums 
for China to work for foreign scientists. All the while China continued to design, manufacture, 
launch, and operate satellites. The overarching theme of this era was economic reform and 
growth – not investing in manned space or military space programs.  
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 Economic development within China during this era sparked China’s investment in 
geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) telecommunication satellites.
65
 Domestic demands for 
satellite TV started growing in the late 1970s and China was forced to lease bandwidth from 
foreign COMSAT providers – who, in China’s eyes, would be willing to cut satellite 
communication (SATCOM) access regardless of China’s SATCOM needs in an international 
conflict.
66
 China sought alternatives to foreign suppliers and invested in its telecommunications 
infrastructure. COMSATs had economic benefits: they alleviated the need for terrestrial 
infrastructure in rural areas of China. China could use COMSATs to perform distance education, 
which would provide education services to portions of the country that suffered from a lack of 
experienced teachers following China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). China’s leaders 
correctly assumed it was cheaper to launch a COMSAT than to hardwire all of rural China, since 
much of the Chinese state is mountainous. Despite the obvious advantages of satellites, China 
still did not give priority to the space program (other than select civilian satellite missions that 
had economic benefits) and other national objectives were pursued more aggressively.
67
 
 For this analysis, it would be unnecessary to explain in detail all of China’s launches in 
the history of its space program. China launched a number of satellites into LEO following its 
first two successful programs. It was not until the 1980s that China expanded its spacecraft into 
GEO.
68
 China’s first GEO satellite, the DongFangHong-2 (homage to the DFH-1), provided 
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China telecommunication services from 125 degrees East longitude. The satellite had a launch 
mass of 916kg, was 2-axis stabilized, and had a communications payload of two transponders.  
 In March 1986, several Chinese engineers lobbied Deng Xiaoping to invest in high-tech 
research and development (R&D) to stay relevant and competitive to western powers. This 
appealed to Deng’s proposed “4 modernizations” and his positive views of R&D as a productive 
force within China.
69
 Later that year, China initiated the National High Technology Research and 
Development Program (aka the 863 Program) with the purpose of enhancing China’s R&D and 
high-tech abilities and China’s space program was injected with additional funds and a sense of 
purpose. This marked the beginnings of China’s “normal” space program. Handberg and Li 
describe a normal space program as “one where the basic resources are assumed to be in place, 
both technologically and scientifically, and the question becomes which specific applications or 
objectives should be pursued.” 
70
 
 The boosted China space program led to China opening up its space launch services to 
the international market. Despite China launching satellites for years domestically, it was a 
newcomer to the international launch market and had to prove itself as a reliable space launch 
provider. From 1985 to 1995, China experienced relative success in the commercial launch 
market. It was not until a string of Chinese space launch failures resulted in complete losses of 
several foreign satellites in 1995-1996, with some failures resulting in the loss of Chinese lives, 
that the Chinese space launch program suffered a significant setback. The successive failures 
triggered an investigation by Chinese and US engineers, as the US wanted to ensure its satellites 
would launch successfully. China, opening up its space launch vehicle (SLV) program to the US 
in the mid-1990s, shared technical data with the US, while the US shared technical data about the 
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satellites set to launch on Chinese SLVs. This triggered a US congressional commission in 1998 
to investigate whether US proprietary information was inadvertently shared with the Chinese. 
The committee determined the Chinese were actively collecting US space program secrets.
71
 
Following the commission, the US levied restrictions on technology transfers to countries that 
may negatively impact US national security and banned use of Chinese SLVs for US satellite 
launches. The loss of US space technologies for China’s own satellites, following the tech 
transfer restrictions may have prompted China’s indigenous development of space rated 
components, an unforeseen consequence of the congressional commission.
72
  
 China published its fourth space white paper in December 2016 (the first three published 
in 2000, 2006, and 2011, respectively).
73
 The publication describes the current space program’s 
objectives, vision, and principles’ while outlining China’s strategic goals for the next five years. 
Major themes within the document are the use of space for peaceful development and the space 
industry as an integral part of China’s overall development strategy. It summarizes China’s 
recent space accomplishments since 2011, highlights international space cooperation, and 
outlines major tasks China aims to complete in the next five years.  
 According to China’s fourth space white paper, China achieved remarkable space 
accomplishments between 2011 and December 2016, noting its space program’s rapid growth 
and enhancement of its domestic space capabilities. China’s SLVs, the Long March series of 
launchers, completed 86 launch missions, sending over 100 spacecraft into a variety of orbits, 
with a 97.67 success rate. The suite of SLVs provides China access to all orbital regimes. The 
largest Long March SLV, the Long March-5, made its maiden flight in November 2016 and has a 
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maximum payload capacity of 25 tons to LEO and about 14 tons to GEO.
74
 China has improved 
the capabilities of its weather, ocean monitoring, high-resolution, remote-sensing, and mapping 
constellations.
75
 China is now capable of collecting sub-meter resolution optical images from 
remote sensing satellites in LEO and has its first GEO high-resolution earth observation satellite, 
the GaoFen-4 satellite. Chinese COMSATs now provide services to the entire Chinese mainland 
and surrounding areas, as well as major areas of the world such as Southeast Asia, the Middle 
East, and Europe. Since 2011, China completed its TianLian-1 data relay constellation. The four 
satellite constellation provides world-wide coverage and supports near real-time communications 
between orbiting spacecraft and ground control operators.
76
 The Tiantong-1 mobile COMSAT 
launched in August 2016. This satellite is a key part of China’s space information infrastructure, 
according to Chinese press.
77
 Lastly, China finished its Beidou Navigation Satellite System 
(Beidou-2) with the networking of 14 Beidou navigation satellites. The Beidou satellites provide 
navigation, timing, and short message communication services to the Asia-Pacific region. The 
summary of Chinese space events from 2011 to December 2016 captures how far China has 
come since its first satellite launch in April 1970. 
 Beijing leaders have put forward a robust plan in space for the next five years. Section 3 
of the 2016 space white paper outlines broad goals in space that China hopes to achieve.  
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In the next five years China plans to expedite the development of its space endeavors by 
continuing to enhance the basic capacities of its space industry, strengthen research into 
key and cutting-edge technologies, and implement manned spaceflight, lunar exploration, 
the Beidou Navigation Satellite System, high-resolution earth observation system, new-
generation launch vehicles and other important projects. Furthermore, the country is to 
launch new key scientific and technological programs and major projects, complete, by 
and large, its space infrastructure system, expand its space applications in breadth and 
depth, and further conduct research into space science, promoting the integrated 
development of space science, technology and applications.
78
 
 
The goals are further expanded in individual sections. For instance, China wants to continue to 
expand its SATCOM capability with an eventual global SATCOM system that provides world-
wide coverage. SATCOM is also mentioned as a key area for future cooperation between China 
and international organizations in the next five years.  
In the next five years China will, with a more active and open attitude, conduct extensive 
international exchanges and cooperation concerning space in the following key areas: 
Construction of the Belt and Road Initiative Space Information Corridor, including earth 
observation, communications and broadcasting, navigation and positioning, and other 
types of satellite-related development; ground and application system construction; and 
application product development.
79
  
 
This suggests China is making calculated decisions with its space assets to support national 
economic objectives. China is specifically targeting states within the Belt and Road corridor to 
be the recipient of Chinese investment in communications and broadcasting.  
China’s space program as a whole is discussed by Handberg and Li. They assess the 
likely future of China’s space program and address the strategic directions China will take. The 
space race between the US and the Soviet Union carved out de facto norms and rules. China 
considers the established norms “as advantaging the presently dominant space power, the United 
States, and as a consequence limiting the efforts of others.” 
80
  Despite this, China does not want 
to disrupt the norms and its goal is to “delay if not prevent significant changes in the regime, 
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especially those understandings and formal agreements rejecting actual placement of weapons in 
outer space – the weaponization of outer space”.
81
 China does not wish to disrupt the norm 
because its leaders understand that a change to the norm would grant the US more power relative 
to China. By keeping the current regime, the US cannot weaponize space and tilt the scale to 
favor the US more than it already does. Weaponization is also mentioned in the 2016 space white 
paper. China reaffirms its commitment to “the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and 
opposes the weaponization of or an arms race in outer space. The country develops and utilizes 
space resources in a prudent manner, takes effective measures to protect the space environment 
to ensure a peaceful and clean outer space and guarantee that its space activities benefit the 
whole of mankind.”
82
 China is quick to call out its measures to protect the space environment, as 
China was accused of being reckless following the 2007 anti-satellite missile test against the 
Fengyun-1C satellite.
83
  
As is the case with most of China’s space white papers, China only sought to highlight 
successes of its space program, to admit failures would only show Chinese weakness to potential 
adversaries and to Chinese citizens. This plan has unintended consequences though, as Handberg 
points out. By only highlighting the successes of its space programs, China’s adversaries have 
incomplete information and assume China’s repeated success is signaling a growing Chinese 
threat.
84
 China suffered successive launch vehicle failures in June and July 2017. In mid-June 
2017 China’s Long March 3B/E SLV failed to properly insert Chinasat-9A into orbit, resulting in 
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a shortened operating life for the satellite.
85
 In July 2017 China’s Long March 5 SLV failed to 
place the ShiJian-18 satellite into orbit, resulting in a complete loss of the satellite.
86
 While the 
Long March failures occurred after the issue of the December 2016 space white paper, the 
exclusion of events similar to these only serve to provide incomplete information, raising the risk 
of foreign miscalculations about China’s space program.   
 China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) is the sole entity within the PRC 
responsible for coordinating Chinese commercial space services to foreign customers. All 
foreign sales of turn-key satellite systems are contracted through CGWIC.
87
 The “company” is 
responsible for “promoting international cooperation for China’s space industry” and is “devoted 
to the internationalized development of China’s space industry.”
88
 Handberg notes that Great 
Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC), an alternate name for CGWIC, “presents the image of 
privatization to the world but the reality is total government control rather than market 
judgements. The Corporation’s function is to facilitate government policy; profits are an 
additional incentive but subordinate to the political.”
89
 This is evident on CGWIC’s public 
website. The major shareholder is China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 
(CASC). CASC, also known as CASC Fifth Academy, was created by Mao in 1956 and is a 
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large state-owned enterprise that “engages in the research, design, manufacture and launch of 
space systems such as launch vehicles, satellites and manned spaceships as well as strategic and 
tactical missiles, and also provides international commercial satellite launch service.” 
90
 The 
enterprise has a number of subsidiary companies – one being CGWIC. In short, CGWIC is 
bankrolled by CASC, a large state owned enterprise that receives its guidance from, and remains 
loyal to, the CCP. 
Another subsidiary of CASC is China Academy of Space Technology (CAST). CAST is 
a world class spacecraft manufacturer and is the prime contractor for Chinese DongFangHong-4 
(DFH-4) satellites. China’s DFH-4 satellite bus is China’s third generation GEO satellite bus and 
provides China with higher power, larger payload capacity, and an extended service life from 
GEO than its predecessor, the DongFangHong-3 (DFH-3).
91
 CAST has also designed several 
variants of the DFH-4 satellite: the DFH-4E, an enhanced version of the DFH-4 with a larger 
payload capacity; the DFH-4S, a smaller version of the DFH-4 with electric propulsion for 
satellite station keeping; and the DFH-4SP, an all-electric version, including apogee kick motor, 
of the DFH-4S.
92
 CAST is currently working on the DFH-5 satellite bus, too. The DFH-5 is 
China’s fourth generation GEO satellite bus and dramatically increases the satellite’s total 
payload mass and power. China’s first launch of the DFH-5 satellite bus failed to reach orbit, due 
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to a SLV failure in July 2017. Collectively, the DFH series satellites provide China with a suite 
of GEO satellites that can be tailored to meet customer requirements.  
China’s Current Space Capabilities 
 
As of 2017, China is estimated to spend about $6 billion a year on its current space 
program.
93
 This has resulted in a combination of manned, commercial, civilian, and military 
spacecraft and satellite programs. China operates satellites in the LEO, medium Earth orbit 
(MEO), and GEO orbital regimes. Collectively, the space program is a source of national pride, 
but individually the space systems provide specific capabilities that aid in the development of 
China and or help China achieve regional and global national objectives. According to the 2017 
U.S. Defense Department’s annual report to the U.S. Congress on Chinese military power, China 
“continues to invest in improving its capabilities in the fields of space-based ISR, satellite 
communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic 
space exploration” and its “space program continues to mature rapidly.”
94
  
China currently relies on the Long March series SLVs for space access. In 2016, China 
revealed two new SLVs: the Long March 7 (LM-7) and the Long March 5 (LM-5). The LM-7 is 
a medium lift SLV capable of inserting approximately 13,500kg into LEO. The LM-7 draws its 
structure from China’s Long March 2F rocket, which is still currently in use. Once proven 
reliable, the LM-7 will likely become China’s new “workhorse launcher tasked with lifting 
future space station resupply vehicles into orbit and carrying satellites to geostationary transfer 
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orbit (GTO).”
95
 China’s newest SLV, the Long March 5, will provide space launch services for 
20-30 years, according to Chinese press.
96
 It was designed to support China’s manned space 
mission and provide access to lunar and Mars missions. The heavy lift SLV first launched in 
November 2016, successfully inserting the ShiJian-17 satellite into GEO; however, its second 
launch failed to insert the ShiJian-18 satellite into orbit in July 2017. As of late 2017, it remains 
to be seen how China’s space program will recover from the LM-5 failure and if there are 
lingering effects.
97
 
China is currently pursuing remote sensing capabilities in LEO and GEO. GaoFen series 
satellites are part of the China High-Resolution Earth Observation System (CHEOS) project and 
provide China with a variety of high-resolution electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar 
imagery in near real-time. Engineers and scientists at China National Space Administration first 
proposed the CHEOS concept in 2006, and it was later approved in 2010. Since approval, China 
has successfully launched six GaoFen satellites into space. Chinese academic writings suggest 
the CHEOS architecture provides China with a capability to monitor urban changes and survey 
coastlines. The architecture is aimed at disaster prevention and reduction, precision agriculture, 
urban planning, and land ownership determination. One of China’s newer GaoFen satellites, 
Gaofen-4, located at 105.6 degrees East longitude in GEO, provides continuous imagery 
coverage of the Chinese mainland and surrounding areas. Speculation exists that despite its 
civilian mission, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “could easily make use of such satellites 
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during Chinese military operations.” The same article mentions GaoFen-4’s potential ability to 
track aircraft carriers, presumably US aircraft carriers.
98
 China’s GaoFen satellites likely 
contribute to China’s foreign policy objectives by providing overhead imagery for One Belt, One 
Road projects and establishing where foreign combatants are based abroad.  
China’s Beidou Navigation Satellite System is China’s positioning and timing service, 
providing services equivalent to the US Global Positioning Service (GPS). The system is 
composed of three segments: the space section; the ground section; and the user section. As of 
late 2017, the space section is composed of 35 satellites in two orbital regimes: a mixture of 
satellites in MEO, GEO, and some in inclined GEO.  China’s Beidou system does not currently 
provide worldwide positioning services; the services are currently limited to the Asia-Pacific 
region, according to China’s 2016 space white paper. China plans on providing basic positioning 
and navigational services to Silk Road countries by 2018 and complete the Beidou constellation 
for global coverage by 2020.
99
 
China operates a number of COMSATs through CASC’s subsidiary China Satellite 
Communications Company Limited (China Satcom). As of late 2017, China Satcom operates 15 
COMSATs in GEO. Collectively, these satellites use a combination of western and Chinese 
satellites buses and provide communication and broadcasting services to mainland China, 
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Australia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa.
100
 See Table 2 for a summary of 
China Satcom’s on-orbit COMSATs. 
Table 2. Current China Satcom Company Assets 
Satellite Bus Launch Date Orbital Position Areas Serviced 
Chinasat-5A Lockheed Martin 
A2100A 
May 30, 1998 142 E Asia-Pacific 
Region 
Chinasat-6A CAST DFH-4 Sept 5, 2010 125 E China, Asia-
Pacific Region 
Chinasat-6B Thales Alenia 
Space SB4000 
July 5, 2007 115.5 E Asia, Australia 
Chinasat-9 Thales Alenia 
Space SB4000 
June 9, 2008 92.2 E China 
Chinasat-9A CAST DFH-4 June 2017 101.4 E China, South 
China Sea 
Chinasat-10 CAST DFH-4 June 21, 2011 110.5 E China, Asia 
Pacific Region 
Chinasat-11 CAST DFH-4 May 2, 2013 98 E Asia Pacific 
Region 
Chinasat-12 Thales Alenia 
Space SB4000 C2 
Nov 27, 2012 87.5 E Asia Pacific 
Region, ME 
Chinasat-15 CAST DFH-4 Jan 26
th
, 2016 51.5 E Africa, Europe, 
ME, Asia 
Chinasat-16 CAST DFH-4S May 12, 2017 110.5 E China 
Apstar-5* Space 
Systems/Loral 
June 29, 2004 138 E Asia Pacific 
Region 
Apstar-6* Thales Alenia 
Space SB4000 C2 
April 12, 2005 134 E Asia Pacific 
Region 
Apstar-7* Thales Alenia 
Space SB4000 C2 
March 31, 2012 76.5 E Asia, Africa, 
Europe, ME 
Apstar-9* CAST DFH-4 Oct 17, 2015 142 E Asia Pacific 
Region 
*China Satcom claims all Apstar satellites as their own resources. CASC is majority owner of 
Asia Pacific Telecommunication (APT)  
Source: China Satellite Communications Company Ltd (http://english.csat.spacechina.com/n931903/index.html, 
2017) 
  
China experienced several setbacks with their first two DFH-4 satellites, as both were 
complete failures. Sinosat-2 and Nigcomsat-1 launched in October 2006 and May 2007, 
                                                          
100
 “Company Profile.” China Satellite Communications Company Ltd. 
http://english.csat.spacechina.com/n931656/n931661/index.html (October 4, 2017). 
36 
 
respectively. Sinosat-2 was a for satellite TV distribution, but shortly after launch one of its solar 
panels failed to deploy, depriving the satellite of the power required to operate.
101
 Nigcomsat-1, 
an exported satellite for Nigeria, had a similar solar panel deployment issue, which also resulted 
in a complete failure.
102
 Following the first two failures, China corrected the failures and the 
DFH-4 has had at least 13 straight successful launches.
103
  
The smaller DFH-4S satellite bus has been used a total of three times for Laosat-1, 
ShiJian-17, and Chinasat-16. All three satellites have recently launched (2015-2017) and were 
successful while experiencing no reported failures. Laosat-1 is a telecommunications satellite 
exported to Laos.
 104
  ShiJian-17 performs a number of missions in GEO, such as 
“communications services, a demonstration of satellite-based navigation in the high-orbit regime 
(using side lobe signals from China’s Beidou navigation satellites), and finally complete a 
demonstration of an optical-sensing payload to observe space debris at high altitude.”
 105
 
Chinasat-16 is China’s first high-throughput (HTS) COMSAT and is capable of transmitting 20 
gigabytes of data per second.
106
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China is yet to use the DFH-4SP or the DFH-4E. As of early 2018, it is unknown when 
China plans to use the DFH-4SP. China intends to launch Chinasat-18 in 2019; this will be the 
first use of the DFH-4E satellite bus.  
Chapter 2: Methodology and Variable Selection 
 
The most different system (MDS) design is the most applicable analysis tool to compare 
the various states that have purchased a satellite from China. MDS design focuses on 
consistencies between multiple cases in regards to the dependent variable. By comparing similar 
outcomes, with different independent variables, comparativists can isolate critical variables that 
are essential to the outcome of the dependent variable. According to Lim, “the MDS design, in 
sum, is an efficient and effective way of launching a comparative research project.”
107
 
All states under study (Nigeria, Venezuela, Pakistan, Bolivia, Laos, Belarus, Algeria, and 
Nicaragua) have signed for the purchase of a communications satellites from China. Since China 
has only sold turn-key communication satellites to a limited number of states, all purchasing 
states will be included in the analysis of the variables. The focus of this research is not “why did 
the state purchase a satellite from China? But rather why did China sell a satellite to this state? 
With the exception of Belarus and Venezuela, all states in this study are not subject to US 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions and could have purchased satellite 
technology from the US or other western satellite providers, but instead the states in this study 
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opted for Chinese satellites.
108
 The most different system design will allow for specific variables 
to be isolated and then subsequently analyzed. My variables to measure are government structure 
of the purchasing state, access to natural resources in purchasing states, the purchasing state’s 
location relative to US allies, worldwide economic rank of the purchasing state, length of formal 
and informal relations with China, and favorability ratings of each state towards the US and 
China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
108
 “Country Policies and Embargoes.” 2017. U.S. Department of State. 
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed_countries/ (October 23, 2017). 
39 
 
Table 3. Variables for Study 
 
N
ig
er
ia
 
V
en
ez
u
el
a 
P
ak
is
ta
n
 
B
o
li
v
ia
 
L
ao
s 
B
el
ar
u
s 
A
lg
er
ia
 
N
ic
ar
ag
u
a*
 
A
fg
h
an
is
ta
n
*
*
 
S
ri
 L
an
k
a*
*
 
D
R
 o
f 
C
o
n
g
o
*
*
 
Government Type (see 
legend below) 
(CIA World Factbook) 
1 1 3 2 4 5 2 2 6 2 7 
Natural Resources- crude 
oil production rank (2015) 
(CIA World Factbook) 
12 11 46 54 155 66 19 178 104 118 71 
State’s Geographic 
Location 
Africa 
South 
America 
Asia 
South 
America 
Asia Europe Africa 
Central 
America 
Asia Asia Africa 
Length of formal relations  
w/ PRC (Research) 
Feb 1971 Jun 1974 
May 
1951 
Jul 1985 
Apr 
1961 
Jan 
1992 
Dec 
1958 
None*** 
Jan 
1955 
Feb 
1957 
Nov 
1972 
Favorable Public Opinion 
of US (Pew Center) 
63% 
(2016) 
51% 
(2015) 
22% 
(2015) 
55% 
(2013) 
N/A N/A N/A 
71% 
(2014) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Favorable Public Opinion 
of China (Pew Center) 
63% 
(2016) 
58% 
(2015) 
82% 
(2015) 
58% 
(2013) 
N/A N/A N/A 
58% 
(2014) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Economic Rank 
(GDP per capita, 2016) 
163 109 171 155 165 95 111 169 207 124 228 
Satellite Sale Contract 
Signed 
(Year) 
2004 2005 2008 2010 2010 2012 2013 2012 2017 2013 2012 
Government type legend: 
1: federal presidential republic 
2: presidential republic  
3: federal parliamentary republic 
4: communist state 
5: presidential republic in name only, although actually a dictatorship 
6: presidential Islamic republic 
7: semi-presidential republic 
* Nicaragua maintains diplomatic relationships with Taiwan. Between 1985 and 1990 Nicaragua broke formal relations with Taiwan, 
but has recognized Taiwan since the relationship was restored 
**Media announced satellite agreements signed, but no significant progress has been reported, questioning the likelihood of sale 
 
Government Structure: 
The government structure of the purchasing states is determined by the CIA World 
Factbook designation. The states under study vary in government structure from federal 
presidential republic, to presidential republic, to federal parliamentary republic, to Communist 
state, to a presidential republic in name only, when the state is actually a dictatorship. This 
variable was selected to discern whether or not China sought deals with like-governed states or if 
China was willing to sell satellites to customers regardless of government type. The government 
40 
 
structure variable, if determined relevant to China’s satellite sale selection process, could 
possibly help identify future Chinese satellite customers.  See table 4 for a description of each 
government type.
109
  
Table 4. Type of Governments 
Federal Presidential 
Republic 
Combines two types of governments: the federal republic and presidential 
system. A federal republic is a state in which the powers of the central 
government are restricted and in which the component parts (states, 
colonies, or provinces) retain a degree of self-government; ultimate 
sovereign power rests with the voters who chose their governmental 
representatives. A presidential system is a system of government where 
the executive branch exists separately from a legislature (to which it is 
generally not accountable). 
Presidential Republic Combines two types of governments: the presidential system and 
republic. A presidential system is a system of government where the 
executive branch exists separately from a legislature (to which it is 
generally not accountable). A republic is a representative democracy in 
which the people's elected deputies (representatives), not the people 
themselves, vote on legislation. 
Federal Parliamentary 
Republic 
Combines two types of governments: the federal republic and 
parliamentary system. The federal republic is a state in which the powers 
of the central government are restricted and in which the component parts 
(states, colonies, or provinces) retain a degree of self-government; 
ultimate sovereign power rests with the voters who chose their 
governmental representatives. The parliamentary system is a political 
system in which the legislature (parliament) selects the government - a 
prime minister, premier, or chancellor along with the cabinet ministers - 
according to party strength as expressed in elections; by this system, the 
government acquires a dual responsibility: to the people as well as to the 
parliament. 
Communist State A system of government in which the state plans and controls the 
economy and a single - often authoritarian - party holds power; state 
controls are imposed with the elimination of private ownership of 
property or capital while claiming to make progress toward a higher 
social order in which all goods are equally shared by the people (i.e., a 
classless society). 
Dictatorship A form of government in which a ruler or small clique wield absolute 
power (not restricted by a constitution or laws).  
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Natural Resources: 
 Natural resources are measured by a state’s total crude oil rank production.
110
 Crude oil is 
a fossil fuel that is composed of hydrocarbons from plants and animals that lived hundreds of 
millions of years ago. Many petroleum products are manufactured from crude oil, to include 
gasoline, heating oil, jet fuel, lubricating oils, asphalt, etc. Crude oil must be pumped from the 
Earth and then refined in order to use.
111
 This variable was selected because China is currently 
developing its Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). According to China’s Commerce Ministry, it 
had accrued 33.25 million tonnes of crude oil in its SPR by mid-2016.
112
 This is a considerable 
achievement since in 2007 China virtually had no strategic reserves at all.
113
 China views its SPR 
as a necessity since access to oil imports are not assured in a US-Sino conflict. China cannot 
match US naval supremacy globally and suspects the US would deny China access to imported 
oil from the sea.
114
 Furthermore, a growing economy requires petroleum based products as it 
continues to grow. To help ensure China will not lose access to oil imports in a potential US-
Sino conflict or the supply for a growing economy, China is attempting to win the trust of 
foreign states involved in the oil production process.
115
 Measuring a state’s crude oil production 
will gauge China’s strategic energy interests in said state. If a state has a large supply of crude oil 
production, then it can reasonably be assumed that China would have increased interest in said 
state. The increased interest and cooperation between the two could result in a satellite sale to 
help guarantee continued relations between the two governments and force continued dialogue 
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between states. This would be akin to China using its satellite technology as a carrot in its suite 
of statecraft options, as China uses its satellites to woo customers into guaranteed access to 
natural resources.  
Purchasing states location relative to US allies/supporters: 
The purchasing state’s location relative to US allies will test encirclement. The US has a 
number of allies globally, specifically within Southeast Asia. Key US allies in Southeast Asia are 
Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, and Australia. The global network of 
alliances is a major power sources the US.  The US alliance system is unmatched and creates a 
US sphere of influence around China and Chinese interests abroad. China, weary of encirclement 
from the warring states’ stratagems, could possibly be attempting to sell satellites to states in an 
attempt to guarantee relationships with states near US strategic allies or interests. This could 
possibly grant China a means to counter US influence and alliances abroad. Furthermore, a 
satellite sale could potentially lead to Chinese military basing rights in the purchasing country. It 
is speculated that China would build a military base in Pakistan (a purchaser of Chinese satellite 
technology), though these reports are denied by the Chinese government.
 116
 China has already 
proven they are ready to expand the PLA’s global footprint by basing troops beyond mainland 
China. In August 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, creating what 
could be the first of many Chinese bases abroad. By selling satellites, and then leveraging the 
sales to support future cooperation, China could be attempting to subtly combat US 
encirclement.  
Worldwide economic rank of the purchasing state: 
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 For decades China has marketed itself as the leader of the developing world. China first 
positioned itself as the global leader of developing states at the Bandung Conference in 1955.
117
 
The conference, held in Indonesia, was a meeting of leaders from various newly formed and 
developing states in Asia and Africa.
118
 Since, China has continued to craft itself as the de-facto 
leader and that position has been strengthened in recent decades due to China’s dramatic 
economic growth.  As the self-proclaimed leader, China might be targeting developing nations 
specifically as a means to lift other states out of poverty and aid in their development. The 
purchasing state’s worldwide economic ranking will allow us determine if China is targeting 
developing nations specifically. As of late 2017, All Chinese satellites sale contracts signed, with 
the exception of Belarus, are to developing economies; however, it remains to be determined if 
economic development is part of China’s calculus when accepting satellite customers.
119
   
Length of formal and informal relations with China: 
 China initiated formal relations with foreign states following its declaration of victory in 
the Chinese Civil War in 1949. It is possible that China is leveraging long-standing relationships 
with other state-actors to facilitate satellite sales. China could treat satellite sales as a reward for 
formal relations or as a show of good faith between the two actors. Formal relationships have an 
additional significance in China. Per the one China policy, states maintain formals relations with 
either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Republic of China (ROC, aka Taiwan).
120
 In 
1994, China publicly announced that it “would use all economic and diplomatic resources to 
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reward countries that are willing to isolate Taiwan.”
121
 It is possible that satellite sales are 
incentives to woo states from Taiwan’s influence, especially since Taiwan has targeted 
developing nations through its “Go South” strategy since the 1990s.
122
  
Favorability ratings of each state towards the US and China: 
 China could be targeting states that favor China over the US for investment and satellite 
sales specifically. Limited information from public polling indicates that China has a slight edge 
in favorability over the US in purchasing states. China could be targeting China friendly states 
and populations to be the benefactor of Chinese investment as a means to cultivate public 
opinion abroad and help erase global perceptions that China’s rise is something to be feared. 
Analysis of public opinion before and after each satellite contract signing ceremony and satellite 
launch could possibly reveal a causal relationship between satellite sales and public opinion.  
Hypothesis and Expectations 
 
Beijing leaders almost certainly consider several variables when determining whether it 
will sell a satellite to a purchasing state. China and China Great Wall Industry Corporation 
(CGWIC) consider financial earnings on satellite sales secondary to political objectives, so its 
assumed the primary motivation for satellite sales is not as simple as earning a sale. Each of the 
identified variables will impact China’s calculus when selling a satellite, but I expect that the 
most applicable variables that support the sale are probably the purchasing state’s economic rank 
and the purchasing state’s geographic position relative to the US and its allies. China is likely 
using satellites to purchase influence in desired states, but it remains to seen how China intends 
to use its influence and how it can affect US foreign policy.  
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 Analysis of each satellite sale will likely reveal China’s intentions and motivations. 
Different variables probably have different priorities depending on the purchasing state. For 
instance, China may have different motivations when signing a satellite contract with Nicaragua 
versus when signing with Pakistan. Underlying themes between sales will be highlighted and 
incorporated into a parsimonious explanation of China’s actions.  
Chapter 3: Case Studies 
 
China has successfully exported satellites to a number of countries around the world. 
Analysis of each satellite sale may reveal in patterns in relationships between China and the 
purchasing state as well as some of the goals the PRC is hoping to achieve. It is likely that China 
has different objectives and desired end states with each satellite sale, but overall China’s 
preferred outcome likely is associated with increased influence in the purchasing state. Each 
satellite sale is the likely the product of targeted Chinese engagement.  
Nigeria 
 
China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) signed a deal with Nigeria’s National 
Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) on December 15
th
, 2004 in Abuja, 
Nigeria for the in-orbit delivery of the Nigcomsat-1 communications satellite (COMSAT).
123
 The 
deal included the satellite, delivery of the satellite into orbit, insurance, technology transfer, 
satellite operator training, and two satellite ground stations.
124
 The satellite contract totaled $311 
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million, of which $112 million is the cost of the satellite.
125
 This satellite contract was China’s 
first commercial satellite contract. Shortly after launch, Nigcomsat-1 experienced a catastrophic 
solar array anomaly and the satellite failed. China subsequently built a replacement satellite, 
Nigcomsat-1R, and launched the satellite into orbit for Nigeria.
126
  
Formal diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria began on February 10
th
, 1971. 
The relationship between the two was largely in name only until several events in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Nigeria experienced several military coups in the 1980s and 1990s and was not 
considered a stable state for much of those decades (China had its own domestic issues then, 
too). It was not until Nigeria’s democratic election in 1999, when Olusegan Obasanjo was 
elected president, that China’s and Nigeria’s relationship took off. The election also roughly 
coincided with China’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing in 2000. One of the 
Forum’s major results was the creation of China’s new approach to Africa; one that would 
support a stable, long-term and mutually beneficial partnership between China and African 
states. According to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website, African nations offer strong 
support of Chinese unity and most African nations support China’s “one-China” policy.
127
 
Nigeria’s President Obasanjo echoed support for China’s national unity in 2005 when discussing 
China’s Anti-Secession Law, which was aimed at preventing Taiwanese independence.
128
  
It is less clear whether Obasanjo’s presidency or China’s renewed attention in Africa led 
to the increase in cooperative actions between Nigeria and China in the early 2000s; however, we 
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know that President Obasanjo sought to take Nigeria in a different strategic direction and China 
sought to establish stable relations with African states. The two factors likely worked in 
conjunction with one another and fostered an increase in official state visits and major 
agreements between the two states.  
President Obasanjo approached Chinese President Hu Jintao for infrastructure projects in 
exchange for oil deals, leading to a plan dubbed “oil-for-infrastructure.”
129
 For instance, in 2006 
China secured four drilling licenses in Nigeria in exchange for the construction of railroad and 
power stations in Nigeria.
130
 President Obasanjo reportedly recognized Nigeria’s dire 
infrastructure circumstances and the conditions associated with Western aid were not favorable 
to Nigeria’s president (read: “aid with conditions”). Obasanjo was persuaded by China’s 
seemingly hands-off approach to Nigeria’s internal affairs and its impressive infrastructure 
during state visits. The Nigerian-Chinese deals were regarded as corrupt and inefficient, and 
when President Obasanjo was replaced by President Yar’Adua in 2007 most of the oil-for-
infrastructure deals were cancelled or suspended.
131
 President Yar’Adua’s approach to China 
resulted in cooled relations and little progress in infrastructure was achieved. President Yar’Adua 
passed in 2010 due to a heart-related condition and his vice president was elevated to 
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president.
132
 At this point, the newly appointed President Jonathan resumed the Nigeria-China 
relationship that President Obasanjo initiated. 
133
 
China is one of Nigeria’s primary trading partners. Since 1999, Chinese-Nigerian trade 
has grown steadily to the point where China is Nigeria’s top importer of goods. The relationship 
is very lop-sided though, as China does not import many goods from Nigeria. China imports 
limited amounts of petroleum products from Nigeria. The amount of Nigerian imports into China 
has grown since 2000, but not nearly as dramatically as China’s imports into Nigeria. China has 
a diversified set of exports into Nigeria consisting of machinery, equipment, and manufactured 
commodities and consumer goods while China primarily imports petroleum products from 
Nigeria. According to the UN Commercial Trade database, Nigerian imports from China have 
grown from 253 million in 2000 to 7,712 million in 2016. Conversely, Nigeria exported 1,689 
million dollars’ worth of goods to China in 2016, of that 1,072 million were petroleum related 
products.  In 2000, China imported 140 million dollars’ worth of goods from Nigeria – all 
petroleum related products. 
134
 To put the amount of oil exported to China in perspective, China 
imported approximately 14 billion dollars’ worth of petroleum related products from Angola in 
2016, Africa’s largest exporter of petroleum products to China.
135
 The oil-for-infrastructure deals 
have contributed to some strife within Nigeria, as some have argued that Chinese imports are 
negatively affecting Nigerian businesses, since the influx of cheap, Chinese goods are stealing 
                                                          
132
 “Nigeria's president Yar'Adua dies.” 2010. Al Jazeera. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/05/20105523627997165.html (December 17, 2017). 
133
 Egbula, M. op. cit. 
134
 “UN Comtrade Analytics - Trade dashboard.” United Nations. https://comtrade.un.org/labs/data-explorer/ 
(December 17, 2017). 
135
 “Products that China imports from Angola (2016).” The Observatory of Economic Complexity. 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/ago/show/2016/ (December 17, 2017). 
“Russia Wrests Crown of Top China Oil Supplier From Saudi Arabia.” 2017. Bloomberg.com. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-23/russia-wrests-crown-of-top-china-oil-supplier-from-saudi-
arabia (December 17, 2017). 
49 
 
profits from local Nigerian companies.
136
 Figure 2 shows the relatively slow increase in Nigerian 
goods flowing to China and the explosive growth of imports into Nigeria from China. According 
to press reports, China is set to purchase records amount of oil in 2017 from African nations, but 
most of the imports will likely come from Angola, China’s primary African oil exporter.
137
 
 
 
Figure 2. Nigeria and China Trade Balances 
  Despite the growing relationship with China, Nigerian businesses trade substantial 
amounts of market goods with the United States. Nigeria was the US’ 50
th
 largest goods export 
market in 2015 and received $3.4 billion worth of goods. These goods included mineral fuels and 
machinery. Furthermore, the US imported $1.9 billion of goods from Nigeria in 2015. While the 
US-Nigerian trade relationship has decreased in total value since its peak in 2008, a strong 
economic relationship remains. Comparison of US and Chinese imports and exports to Nigeria 
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reveals trends that suggest Nigeria is leaning more on China for imports with a decrease in 
exports to the US (likely associated with an uptick US domestic oil production). This trend 
suggests that Nigeria is finding alternative markets for their oil exports.
138
 
 
 
Figure 3. Nigeria and US Trade Balances 
The US maintains a military presence in several African states, including a permanent 
presence in Djibouti. US forces in Africa, aside from Djibouti, are typically assisting and 
advising local militaries and are acting in a supporting role.
139
 The US is committed to fighting 
terrorism in Africa and continues to support Africa’s fight against Boko Haram, al-Qaeda, and 
the Islamic State.
140
 The Nigerian military cooperates with the US in annual counter-terrorism 
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exercises, such as FLINTLOCK 2017, and the US has provided economic and military 
commitments.
141
 The assistance has come with continued US suggestions that Nigeria needs to 
review its economic policies.
142
 China does not have the same level of military presence in 
Africa as the US; however, in recent years that commitment appears to be growing. In 2017, 
China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, not far from the US base (Camp 
Lemonnier, Djibouti), to likely protect Chinese economic interests in Africa. The base comes 
shortly after China and Nigeria pledged closer military cooperation to fight terrorism in 2013.
143
 
It is unknown whether the pledge for increased cooperation will result in meaningful cooperation 
or if it is solely for media headlines. China likely advocates for closer military cooperation as a 
means to call for increased stability within Nigeria. China probably wants to assure Nigerian 
markets are stable for Chinese imports.  
In 2004, CGWIC won the contract to build the Nigcomsat-1 satellite over at least 21 
other satellite contractors.
144
  China was reportedly the only satellite contractor to submit the 
completed proposal by the requested deadline and had met Nigeria’s requirements. Russian and 
Israeli bidders were unable to meet the requested terms, while US contractors allegedly talked 
down to General Robert Boroffice, the director of NASRDA. Boroffice also suggested that US 
satellite contractors were likely weary of US-export control laws and that US and European 
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contractors did not believe Nigeria was serious in its request for proposals.
145
 China’s winning 
proposal provided Nigeria with the Nigcomsat-1 satellite, a satellite ground station to command 
and control the satellite, a comprehensive training program for Nigerian satellite operators, and 
15 years of customer service support.
146
 The satellite contract was worth $311 million, set to be 
paid over an unknown number of years. Despite the large price tag associated with the contract, 
in 2004, Nigeria claimed the satellite would reduce the outflow of approximately $100 million 
worth of capital from Nigeria to outside SATCOM service providers.
147
 Nigcomsat-1 failed 18 
months after launch, well below the satellite’s intended 15-year system design life.
148
 By the 
time its replacement satellite, Nigcomsat-1R, was launched in 2012, Nigeria estimated that 
Nigerians spent approximately $1 billion in SATCOM bandwidth leases. SATCOM industry 
officials do not believe that figure to be accurate. Separately, Nigeria also claimed its SATCOM 
industry generated $455 million in sales, which is also believed to be inaccurate.
149
  
The satellite contract process, as revealed by Boroffice, suggests Nigerian officials were 
inclined to select China’s bid, despite having previously worked with Britian’s Surrey Satellite 
Technology Limited, because China was the only bidder to complete the proposal by the 
requested due date.
150
 At the time of award, China did not have any experience building satellites 
for foreign nations or external customers. This seems to have avoided affecting Nigeria’s 
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decision making. The Nigcomsat-1R satellite program receives heavy criticism and many accuse 
the program of terrible mismanagement not delivering the promised results. Customers in 
Nigeria choose more established SATCOM operators, citing Nigcomsat’s lack of experience. 
Nigcomsat employs nearly 400 people while larger SATCOM operators employ less than 50 (of 
the approximate 400 employees, 49% are assistant managers or higher).
151
 Nigeria intends on 
purchasing two more COMSATs from China despite not utilizing its current system citing the 
need for additional resources to secure customers.
152
 It is unlikely that additional COMSATs will 
solve Nigeria’s satellite management issues and deliver the already promised results.  
China’s satellite sale to Nigeria occurs during a period of public opinion transition for 
many living in Nigeria. According to the Pew Center Global Attitudes and Trends Question 
Database, Nigerians have had warming opinions on China in recent years. In 2006 only 59% of 
Nigerians polled held a favorable opinion of China. By 2017, that figure rose to 72%.
153
 
Similarly, Nigerian opinions of the US rose between 2006 and 2017, too. In 2006, 62% of 
Nigerians held favorable opinions (non-national sample) of the US and by 2017 that number rose 
to 69%. Historic opinion polling indicates that Nigerian public opinion of the US was at its 
highest in 2010, when 81% of Nigerian held a favorable view of the US. China’s increased 
activity in Nigeria, through its imports, investment, and cultural exchanges, such as its Confucius 
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Institutes, have likely contributed to the increase in public opinion by Nigerians over the last 
decade.
154
 
The successful satellite sale between Nigeria and China was China’s first attempt at 
exporting a complete satellite package to a purchasing state. China likely learned valuable 
lessons from the sale, such as how to approach potential buyers, what services will be required 
for a successful sale, and how to market a total COMSAT solution. The valuable lessons learned 
from the Nigcomsat-1 sale were likely then applied to other satellite contracts.   
Venezuela 
 
China successfully sold and launched three satellites for Venezuela between 2008 and 
2017. Venezuela has purchased a single COMSAT (Venesat-1) and two remote sensing satellites 
(VRSS-1 and VRSS-2). The Venesat-1 COMSAT deal was signed on November 1
st
, 2005 and 
the satellite launched October 2008, the VRSS-1 satellite contract was signed in May 2011 and 
launched September 2012, while the VRSS-2 satellite contract was signed in October 2014 and 
launched in October 2017. Venesat-1 is also referred to as Simon Bolivar Satellite and VRSS-1 
and VRSS-2 are also referred to as Francis Miranda Satellites. The alternate names for each 
satellites honor former fighters involved in the struggle for Venezuela’s independence. China 
constructed ground stations in Venezuela, trained Venezuelan satellite engineers, and provided 
launch and early orbit operations as part of the agreed terms to each contract.
155
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China and Venezuela established official diplomatic relations in 1974. Little actual 
cooperation or engagement between the two existed until 2001. In 2001, China and Venezuela 
established a strategic partnership of common development and in 2005 Venezuela supported 
China’s anti-secession laws.
156
 The partnership was subsequently upgraded in 2013 to a 
“comprehensive strategic partnership” to deepen political trust and mutually beneficial 
cooperation between the two actors, the first such agreement between China and a Latin 
American state. The upgraded partnership sought to emphasize cooperation in new areas such as 
finance, energy, mining, agriculture and infrastructure.
157
 Since the announcement of the 
partnership, China has had multiple official state visits to Venezuela to demonstrate its 
commitment to its partner.
158
 More recently China has been propping up Venezuela as its 
economy spins out of control due years of economic mismanagement, inflation, and collapsed 
global oil prices.
159
 China has lent Venezuela $60 billion since 2001.
160
 These funds have 
enabled Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro to remain in power. He is wildly unpopular in 
Venezuela and only is supported by approximately 23% of the Venezuelan population.
161
 As of 
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September 2017, China remained committed to its policy of non-interference and reaffirmed at 
the UN that its policy towards Venezuela will not change.
162
 This could potentially have negative 
consequences, as Chinese investment in Venezuela may be lost.  
China is Venezuela’s second largest trading partner, behind the US. In 2015 China 
primarily imported crude petroleum, refined petroleum, and iron ore (this composed 
approximately 97.7% of all Venezuelan exports to China). Venezuela, on the other hand, 
imported a wide variety of goods from China in 2015. The variety of goods, consisting of 
machinery, transportation equipment, metals, textiles, totaled approximately $2.5 billion. This is 
down from 2010, when Venezuela imported approximately $3.8 billion worth of goods, but an 
increase from 2005, when the total imports were valued at $913 million. Lastly, China exported 
only $221 million to Venezuela in 2000. The growing trade relationship indicates China has 
become an increasingly more important player in the Venezuelan economy. Decreased exports 
from Venezuela to China in 2016 are likely attributed to Venezuela’s economic situation and 
unrest at home. Venezuela reportedly owes China roughly $30 billion in oil exports as of 2016 
(per the oil-for-loan deals).
163
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Figure 4. Venezuela and China Trade Balances 
 The US is Venezuela’s primary trading partner, serving as the destinations for 
approximately 43% of Venezuelan exports and the originator of 29% of Venezuela’s imports. 
The primary export to the US is crude petroleum (accounting for 85% of exports).
164
  According 
to the US Department of Commerce, approximately 82 thousand jobs are created in Venezuela as 
a direct result from the US-Venezuelan trade relationship.
165
 This is figure is almost certainly 
down from recent years, likely as a result from a decline in total volume of trade between the two 
states. Furthermore, the US has continued to place sanction of the Venezuelan government. The 
US intends to place more pressure on President Maduro to return the country to a democracy.
166
 
Maduro has suggested the US wants a trade war, and in response has listed oil price exports 
under the Yuan, China’s currency, as an attempt to free Venezuela from “the tyranny of the 
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dollar.”
167
  It is very unlikely that President Maduro actually wants the US-Venezuelan 
relationship to cease, since it would almost certainly result in the absolute collapse of the 
Venezuelan economy and he would cease to have what little public support he still holds.  
 
Figure 5. Venezuela and US Trade Balances 
 The US does not have a permanent military presence in South America; however, US 
military personnel are stationed in close proximity to Venezuela. The US operates Joint Task 
Force Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras and Joint Task Force Guantanamo at US Naval 
Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
168
 These forces, along with the historical precedence set by the 
US, position the US to lead and resolve situations or humanitarian crises that arise in South 
America. Even though China lacks permanent military presence in South America, since at least 
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2011, Beijing has sent military forces to train in undisclosed South American states.
169
 Its 
speculated the trainings occurred in Venezuela or Argentina and supported counter-terrorism 
missions.
170
 China’s troop deployment to South America, and particularly Venezuela, may serve 
multiple benefits. First, the deployment can strengthen ties between China and other states. It can 
enhance cooperation and lay the groundwork for future military cooperation and possibly 
permanent military basing rights. Secondly, it can serve as relevant operational training that 
could potentially support the evacuations of Chinese citizens from Venezuela if the state were to 
collapse. Overall, China is in a much less advantageous position than the US in projecting power 
in South America.  
 China won the bid to build Venezuela’s Venesat-1 satellite, provide launch services, 
construct the required ground facilities, and train Venezuelan satellite operators. It is unknown 
how many other satellite contractors bid on the Venesat-1 request, or if the bid was even made 
public.
171
 Venezuela was China’s first Latin American satellite customer, and since the Venesat-
1 deal the two states have collaborated on several other projects, including the VRSS-1 and 
VRSS-2 satellites. The Venesat-1 deal was reportedly worth $241 million for the satellite and 
launch services and $165 million for the construction of two satellite control stations – bringing 
the total cost of the project to over $400 million.
172
  Venesat-1 launched on October 30
th
, 2008 
and was successfully handed over the Venezuela on December 1
st
, 2008.
173
 As of 2014, after the 
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satellites first six years of operation, Venesat-1 was yet to have a significant impact on 
Venezuela’s and South America’s SATCOM industry, according to industry officials.
174
 
Venezuela intended on using the satellite to support telecommunications, distance learning, e-
medicine, and cultural exchanges. The satellite project was a step in strengthening the strategic 
relationship between China and Venezuela, said Venezuelan government officials.
175
  
Venezuela has also purchased two remote sensing satellites from China, VRSS-1 and 
VRSS-2. The satellites provide Venezuela with electro-optical images varying in resolution from 
1-meter panchromatic to 10-meter multispectral images. Venezuela says the satellites support 
environmental management, disaster detection, and urban planning. The satellites are able to 
image Venezuela three times a day and the same location, from the same collection geometry, 
once approximately every 51 days.
176
 It is unknown if Venezuela accepted public bids for its two 
remote-sensing satellites or if Venezuela only accepted offers from China. Venezuela may have 
decided to pursue remote-sensing satellite solutions from China because the established 
relationship between the two (strategic partnership, previous satellite deal). It is also unknown if 
the ongoing economic crisis in Venezuela will affect or jeopardize the return on China’s 
investment in Venezuela.  
 Venezuelans hold somewhat favorable opinions of China. According to the Pew Center 
Global Attitudes and Trends Question Database in 2015, approximately 52% of Venezuelans 
hold a favorable view of China. This is down significantly from recent years (58% in 2015, 67% 
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in 2014, and 71% in 2013).
177
 This negative trend in public opinion likely stems from poorly 
structured Chinese backed loans and China’s policy of aid without conditions. As Venezuela’s 
economic situation continuing to spiral, and Chinese immigrants and investment leave Venezuela 
and local Venezuelans see little positives from the Sino-Venezuelan relationship.
178
 Conversely, 
Venezuelan opinions towards the US have remained relatively unchanged in recent years (47% 
favorability rating in 2017, 53% in 2013).
179
 It is likely public perception and favorability for 
both China and US will continue to drop or remain unchanged in the coming years if 
Venezuela’s economic conditions do not improve.  
 The Chinese-Venezuelan relationship has blossomed since the partnership in 2001, but 
little is to show for the relationship today mainly due to Venezuela’s economic situation. China 
must work with Venezuela to fix its political issues but is unlikely to do so per its non-
interference policy. The satellite sales are one of few tangible areas where cooperation, if 
managed correctly, can improve the lives of Venezuelans and become a success story for China.  
Pakistan 
 
 Pakistan and China signed a deal for the Paksat-1R COMSAT on October 15
th
, 2008 and 
the satellite was launched August 11
th
, 2011.
180
 The satellite was built to replace the aging 
Paksat-1 satellite, which was not a Chinese built satellite. The satellite contract is worth a $222.3 
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million and is financed through China’s Import-Export Bank and the Pakistani government.
181
 
Per the satellite agreement, China would build the satellite, ground control stations, provide 
satellite launch services, and provide training to Pakistani satellite operators. The Paksat-1R 
contract was China’s third satellite contract for a foreign customer and its first satellite contract 
for an Asian customer.
182
  
 Pakistan and China established diplomatic relations in 1951 and maintained a close 
relationship with one another, fairly steadily, since the early 1950s.
183
 Pakistan and China 
furthered the relationship in 2003 by publically committing to increase cooperation and to 
develop deeper bilateral relations between the two and in 2005 Pakistan offered support for 
China’s anti-secession laws.
184
 Pakistan and China have since signed several memorandums of 
understanding and agreements to demonstrate their commitment to one another. One agreement, 
the China Pakistan Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect in 2007, opened Chinese and 
Pakistani markets to increased trade and investment.
185
 China, in its announcement upon signing 
the agreement, mentioned how the two states share common interests and goals, since both states 
are developing countries. China intended to invest in areas such as energy, information 
technology, and infrastructure in Pakistan and in return hoped Pakistan would support Chinese 
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international interests.
186
 Perhaps the most high profile initiative between China and Pakistan is 
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
187
 CPEC is actually a series of agreements that 
allows for a number of energy, infrastructure, and transit projects, backed by Chinese 
investment, to connect Chinese and Pakistani economic centers.
188
 CPEC is a major project 
under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.   
 China is one of Pakistan’s top trade partners, as approximately 30% of Pakistan’s imports 
originate from China. This equates to roughly $17.2 billion worth of trade (in 2016). The total 
amount of imports has risen in recent years; up from $5.5 billion in 2010 and $2.7 billion in 
2005. Conversely, only 8% of Pakistan’s total exports are sent to China.  Pakistan’s exports to 
China are mainly textile and vegetable products. In 2016, Pakistan’s total exports to China were 
reportedly worth $1.5 billion. This figure is down from 2010, when Pakistan exported $1.8 
billion worth of goods to China, and up from 2005, when the total value of the exports was $670 
million. Interestingly, China does not appear to import significant quantities of crude or refined 
petroleum from Pakistan. This may change in the coming years, as Pakistan recently discovered 
one of its largest oil and natural gas reservoirs in October 2017. The new oil field will supply at 
least 23 million barrels of oil and 292 billion cubic feet of gas.
189
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Figure 6. Pakistan and China Trade Balances 
 In 2016, the US was Pakistan’s primary recipient of trade goods, receiving approximately 
17% of all Pakistani exports. The exports, which were valued at $3.4 billion, sent to the US 
mainly consisted of textile products. The US-Pakistan trade relationship appears to be very stable 
and has not fluctuated much in recent years (in 2005 Pakistan exports $3.3 billion and in 2010 
$3.5 billion to the US).
190
 As of 2105, US-Pakistan trade is responsible for 10 thousand jobs in 
Pakistan, according to the US Department of Commerce. 
191
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  Figure 7. Pakistan and US Trade Balances 
The Paksat-1R satellite contract was officially awarded to China on October 15
th
, 2008. 
In reality though, the decision to have China build the Pakistani satellite was awarded months 
earlier. According to Paksat-1R planning documents from Pakistan Space & Upper Atmosphere 
Research Commission (SUPARCO), Pakistan had intended on awarding the contract to China 
months before the satellite contract was publically awarded and signed, as the documents reveal 
that the Paksat-1R satellite manufacturer would preferably be Chinese. The documents further 
reveal that Pakistan’s preference for a Chinese satellite was the direct result of two 
memorandums of understanding, one of which was China and Pakistan’s 2007 agreement to 
strengthen its long-term strategic relationship.
192
 With China being the preferred satellite 
contractor, and then winning the contract, the memorandum of understandings proved useful for 
China. China has had history of signing Memorandums only for it to amount to nothing, but not 
the case for Paksat-1R. It enabled China to win its third foreign satellite contract. It is unknown 
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if the contract was advertised for other satellite manufacturers to bid on or if the satellite request 
for proposals was exclusively sent to CGWIC.  
The Chinese built Paksat-1R satellite included several Pakistani designed and built 
payloads to test and validate Pakistani technology in a space environment. Pakistan included on-
board data handling, power distribution systems, and telemetry payloads on Paksat-1R.
193
 The 
Pakistani payloads meet several objectives, which were revealed in Paksat-1R planning 
documents. First, it encourages participation of Pakistani industries in the project. Second, it 
allows Pakistan to acquire relevant technology know-how. The included payloads, along with 
China training Pakistan’s satellite operators as part of the contract, very likely further develop 
Pakistan’s aerospace industry.
194
  
As of September 2017, the US does not maintain a standing military presence in 
Pakistan.
195
 Nevertheless, there is a strong US presence in the surrounding region. Over a decade 
of military ventures in the Middle East has left the US with significant presence in states directly 
adjacent or not far from Pakistan (Afghanistan, Qatar, Syria, Kuwait). The US once considered 
Pakistan to be one of its best allies in Asia, but US leaders have since accused Pakistan of 
harboring “agents of chaos.”
196
 The relationship was further complicated after the US raided 
Osama Bin Laden’s residence in 2011. Pakistan accused the US of violating its sovereignty by 
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launching the military operation without prior notification.
197
 Officially, the US and Pakistan 
maintain a strong security partnership that works to dismantle terror networks in the Middle East 
but it appears the relationship is not as strong as it once was.
198
  
As of late 2017, China does not have any military bases in Pakistan, although this may 
soon be changing. In May 2017 the Pentagon reported that China “likely will seek to establish 
additional military bases in countries with which it has a longstanding friendly relationship and 
similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan.”
199
 Despite not having a permanent military 
presence, China routinely conducts military exercises with Pakistani military forces to improve 
its tactics, techniques, and procedures. The most recent exercise in September 2017, the 
Shaheen-VI, involved Pakistani and Chinese air forces and lasted nearly 3 weeks.
200
 
Furthermore, Pakistan hosts Chinese Navy ships regularly to increase cooperation and 
communications between the two militaries.
201
  
China has enjoyed strong popular support from Pakistan over the last decade with nearly 
80% of Pakistani citizens having a favorable view of China. The data shows a slight increase in 
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public support in Pakistan from 2005 to 2015, the last year for which data is available. 
202
 This is 
in stark contrast to public opinion toward the US. Generally, Pakistani citizens do not have 
favorable opinions of the US and in 2015 only 22% held favorable or somewhat favorable 
opinions on the US.
203
 Favorability ratings for the US dipped in 2011 to roughly 11% support, 
likely following the US strike on Osama Bin Laden’s compound, but have since recovered to 
pre-strike levels. Overall, China is much more popular than the US among everyday citizens. As 
China continues to invest in Pakistani infrastructure projects its popularity will likely continue to 
rise.  
China and Pakistan have a long, storied history together full of agreements and deals. The 
agreements directly supported Pakistan’s acquisition of the Paksat-1R satellite from China. The 
sale was mutually beneficial. Pakistan was able to continue providing SATCOM services to its 
customers and China was able to gain more international customers.  
Bolivia 
 
Bolivia signed a contract for the in-orbit delivery of the Chinese-made Tupac Katari 
(TKSAT-1) COMSAT on December 13
th
, 2010. According to the contract, China would provide 
Bolivia with a package solution, including the satellite, launch services, ground control stations, 
and satellite operator training. The satellite, also known as Tupac Katari to honor two Bolivian 
independence fighters, was successfully launched into orbit on December 21
st
, 2013.
204
 The 
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entire project cost an estimated $295 million, of which $250 million was financed from China 
Development Bank (with the remaining costs being funded by the Bolivian government).  
Bolivia intended to use the satellite to connect rural Bolivians that were off the 
telecommunications grid. 
205
 
China and Bolivia have maintained diplomatic relations since 1985. On the 25
th
 
anniversary of the relationship, in July 2010, Beijing hosted a celebration reaffirming their 
mutual cooperation.
206
 A month later, in August 2010, China and Bolivia pledged to expand their 
military ties by strengthening exchanges in military and officer training. The pledges were 
announced in Beijing by each state’s Defense Minister. The Bolivian Defense Minister 
emphasized Bolivia’s commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy.
207
 The relationship runs deeper 
than just pledges of military cooperation. China is currently Bolivia’s primary bilateral creditor, 
steadily increasing its role in Bolivia over the last 15 years. As of late 2017 Bolivia owes more 
$600 million to Chinese banks, constituting approximately 10% of Bolivia’s total foreign debt.
208
 
The loans have been used to support a variety on infrastructure and telecommunications projects. 
There were more than 100 Chinese companies operating in Bolivia in mid-2016 (up from 35 in 
2015) and the Chinese presence in Bolivia continues to grow.
209
 In 2013, the two states signed 
multiple agreements involving economic and technical cooperation, agricultural cooperation, and 
cooperation on public safety technology. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs boasts about its 
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relationship with Bolivia, saying the two states “maintained communication and cooperation on 
major international issues including UN affairs and the climate change.”
210
 
Bolivia created the Bolivian Space Agency (ABE) on February 10
th
, 2010 with the 
intention of purchasing a satellite from China.
211
 The satellite contract between China and 
Bolivia was signed in December 2010, but the wheels were officially set in motion in October 
2009 when Bolivian President Morales met with Hu Jintao in Beijing. At the meeting China and 
Bolivia signed a memorandum of understanding for the construction of the TKSAT-1 
COMSAT.
212
 President Morales explained that the satellite would be named after the two 
independence fighters who had given their lives in the fight for the independence of the Bolivian 
people. The final satellite contract, for the in-orbit delivery of TKSAT-1, construction of satellite 
ground stations, satellite operator training, and launch, concluded over two years of negotiations 
between Bolivia and CGWIC, which unofficially started in 2008, prior to the memorandum of 
understanding.
213
 It is unclear what initially drove Bolivia to approach the China for a satellite in 
2008 or if Bolivia considered other satellite contractors before ultimately deciding to pursue a 
Chinese satellite solution.  
The Chinese-Bolivian trade relationship has grown in recent years. In 2015, China was 
the top importer of goods into Bolivia, narrowly beating out Brazil ($1.65 billion vs $1.53 
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billion). In 2015, China was the 5
th
 largest recipient of Bolivian trade, trailing Brazil, Argentina, 
the US, Colombia, respectively.  Bolivia’s exports are worth a total of $9.1 billion and its 
primary exports are petroleum gas, zinc ore, gold and precious metals. Bolivia is rich in precious 
metals, petroleum, and natural gas. Most of its natural resource remains untapped, though.
214
 
China’s growing demand for raw materials, coupled with Bolivia’s untapped resources, positions 
Bolivia to increase its exports to China in the coming years. Despite the relative low volume of 
trade, China’s imports from Bolivia have grown significantly since 2007. Bolivia’s main exports 
to China are precious metals, raw tin, and copper and zinc ore.  
 
Figure 8. Bolivia and China Trade Balances 
 The US is Bolivia’s third largest export destination. The US predominantly imports gold, 
silver, raw tin, and jewelry from Bolivia. The total volume of trade between the US and Bolivia 
does not match the total volume of trade between China Bolivia, but has remained somewhat 
steady in recent years (around $1 billion in total volume). Overall, US trade with Bolivia is up 
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from the mid-2000s, but down from its peak in 2014. An estimated 4,000 jobs in Bolivia are 
supported from US-Bolivian trade.
215
 It remains to be seen if US-Bolivian trade will continue to 
drop from 2014 trade levels or if the total volume of trade will level out.  
 
Figure 9. Bolivia and US Trade Balances 
The US does not maintain a military presence in Bolivia. In 2008, Bolivia expelled the 
US ambassador and US DEA personnel operating in Bolivia and has turned down the 
opportunity to participate in US led military exercises in South America.
216
 Bolivia’s current 
president, Evo Morales, has accused the US of promoting global terrorism through military 
ventures abroad, using the rise of the Islamic State terror group as evidence. In 2016, Bolivia 
opened an ‘anti-imperialist’ school to counter US influence in South America and the developing 
world. And in 2017, President Morales criticized US leadership for politicizing international 
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organizations and suggested the US holds double standards against socialist states.
217
 The US-
Paraguay relationship is also a concern to Bolivian leadership. Paraguay, located southeast of 
Bolivia, has trained and hosted US forces in the past.
218
 Suspicions exist that suggest Washington 
intends on opening a permanent military presence in Paraguay – which President Morales would 
likely view as a threat. President Morales does not hold favorable views of the US and it is 
unlikely that he will allow Bolivia to participate in US led military exercises in the future and the 
existence of US troops in neighboring Paraguay likely does not sit well with him.  
 China also lacks a military presence in Bolivia, even though Beijing trains Bolivian 
soldiers and participates in joint military exercises. The relationship will likely deepen in the 
coming years, as both states publically reaffirmed their commitments to strengthen cooperation 
and boost relation in December 2016.
219
 President Morales directed the Bolivian military to 
acquire Chinese military aircraft and weapons early in his presidency, and more recently in 
October 2017 Bolivia showcased its new Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at the 
Paucarpata II military exercise.
220
 The purchased military equipment will likely be incorporated 
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into annual Chinese-Bolivian military drills. The annual drills attempt to verify the 
“effectiveness of the marine, land and air operations of Bolivian military forces.”
221
  
Few data points exist for Bolivian favorability ratings on the US or China. The most 
recent favorability data from 2013 suggests both China and the US enjoy similar support from 
Bolivia. 55% of Bolivians had favorable views of the US while 58% of Bolivians had favorable 
views of China. Non-national polling samples from 2007 reveal slightly lower favorability 
ratings for the US and China amongst Bolivians.
222
 In 2007, China had 46% favorability rating 
and the US had 42% favorability rating amongst Bolivians. The increase in favorability for 
China probably stems from increased Chinese investment in Bolivia. The TKSAT-1 satellite 
probably helps China’s favorability rating, too. TKSAT-1 is reportedly generating upwards of $2 
million in monthly revenue and is expected to generate $500 million over its mission life.
223
  The 
satellite is extending television and broadband coverage to rural, unconnected regions of Bolivia. 
TKSAT-1, among other Chinese investments in Bolivia, is likely increasing its image. Despite 
President Morales’ public dislike for the US, the US favorability amongst Bolivians is relatively 
high. It is unknown if Chinese or US favorability rating have risen or dropped since 2013.  
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Laos 
 
China launched Laosat-1 for Laos on November 21
st
, 2015.
224
 The satellite was China’s 
fifth launch for an international customer and the first to an Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) state. The contract between Laos and China was signed on February 25
th
, 
2010 and called for the first use of China’s indigenously produced Dongfanghong-4S (DFH-4S) 
satellite bus.
225
 According to the Laosat website, the successful launching of Laosat-1 “is of great 
important significance on the … further implementation of the strategy of the Belt and Road 
Initiative.”
226
 The satellite was financed by China’s Export-Import Bank for a sum of $259 
million and provides telecommunication services to Southeast Asia.
227
  
China and Laos established formal relations in April 1961. The relationship has at times 
been strained, as both countries have delicately balanced relationships with third parties during 
military conflicts in Indochina. Initially, China’s relations consisted of economic support and 
assistance to Laos. China publically backed Laos in its “struggle of the Lao ethnic people against 
foreign imperialists.”
228
 Relations took a significant step forward in 2000, when China’s 
President Jiang Zemin traveled to Laos and signed a joint statement on bilateral cooperation with 
Laos, ensuring comprehensive long-term cooperation between the two states.
229
 The joint 
statement included support for the ‘One China’ policy and paved the way for a number of high-
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profile state visits, which have continued on after transitions of power. Laotian leaders also 
supported China’s anti-secession laws again in 2005.
230
 Since the 2000 joint statement, Laos and 
China signed a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2009 to deepen their mutual trust in 
political and economic affairs.
231
 This has resulted in an increase in Chinese investment and 
infrastructure projects in Laos. Laos is the recipient of a number of Chinese Belt and Road 
projects – the most high profile project being a 414 kilometer (km) railway connecting China to 
Laos. The project costs approximately $6 billion and hopes to connect China to Southeast 
Asia.
232
  
It is unclear whether Laos received multiple bids or offers for Laosat-1 or if the satellite 
contract was even advertised to receive bids.  There are a number of stakeholders in the Laosat-1 
satellite program. Laos owns 45% of the satellite, the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications 
Satellite Company (APMT) owns 35%, Space Star Technology Company Ltd. owns 15%, and 
Asia-Pacific Satellite Technology owns 5%.
233
 APMT and Space Star Technology Co. Ltd. are 
both owned and operated by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC).
234
 
It is interesting that China considers Laosat-1 an exported satellite, when half the rights of the 
satellite are owned by the Chinese government. Furthermore, throughout the process Asia-
Pacific Telecommunication Company Ltd (APT) provided satellite program advising and 
                                                          
230
 “Laos voices support for China's Anti-Secession Law.” 2005. People's Daily Online. 
http://en.people.cn/200503/17/eng20050317_177205.html (December 17, 2017). 
231
 “Laos, China agree to cement strategic partnership.” 2013. Asean Affairs. 
http://www.aseanaffairs.com/laos_news/ties/laos_china_agree_to_cement_strategic_partnership (December 17, 
2017). 
232
 Hutt, David. 2017. “Laos is a key link for China’s Obor ambitions.” Asia Times. 
http://www.atimes.com/article/laos-key-link-chinas-obor-ambitions/ (December 17, 2017). 
233
 De Selding, Peter. 2015. “Laos, with China's Aid, Enters Crowded Satellite Telecom Field.” SpaceNews.com. 
http://spacenews.com/laos-with-chinese-aid-is-latest-arrival-to-crowded-satellite-telecom-field/ (December 17, 
2017). 
234
 “Company Profile.” China Rocket Company Ltd. http://www.apmt.cn/en/about.aspx (December 17, 2017). 
“Company Overview.” Space Star Technology Company Ltd. http://spacestar.com.cn/en/about.html (December 17, 
2017). 
77 
 
consultation to Laos and China APMT.
235
 APT is majority owned by China and also advertises 
Laosat-1 as Apstar-L to customers.
236
 A China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) deputy 
general manager suggested the Laosat-1 satellite was a “significant manifestation of the China-
Laos comprehensive strategic co-operative partnership and also a demonstration project to 
support China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative.”
237
  
While the satellite is operated from Laos and primarily delivers satellite 
telecommunication services to Laos and the Indochina Peninsula, China clearly has a vested 
interest in the success of Laosat-1.
238
 The interests, however large they may be, were not without 
hurdles that were overcome. Laos originally filed with the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) in 2008 and, per ITU regulations, was required to occupy the 128.5 degrees East 
longitude orbital position with a satellite no later than May 13
th
, 2015.
239
 Due to radio-frequency 
de-confliction with neighboring COMSATs (to avoid unintended RF interference), lending 
conditions imposed by China’s Export-Import bank resulting in litigation, and late payments 
from Laos to China, Laos was not able to meet the 13 May 2015 deadline was forced to obtain an 
extension from the ITU, extending the deadline to 31 December 2015. Laos was granted the 
extension since Laos is a least-developed state. The ITU deadlines reveals Laos was considering 
a satellite as early as 2008 – which predates China’s strategic cooperative partnership with Laos. 
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It is possible that China pushed Laos to set up the joint ventures with APMT and SSTC and 
offered a lucrative deal for the satellite, under the guise of the strategic cooperative partnership, 
as a means to gain access to an orbital position and telecommunication services over Southeast 
Asia for another Chinese made satellite.  
China is Laos’ second largest trading partner next to Thailand.
240
 In 2016 China imported 
approximately $1.2 billion worth of goods from Laos. The imports primarily consisted of copper 
ore and bananas (those two imports accounted for 75% and 10% of total imports, respectively). 
Laos imported a variety of products from China in 2016 totaling about $1 billion in imports. The 
bulk of Laotian imports from China were machines, transportation equipment, and metal 
products.
241
 Chinese demand for Lao products has created tension between Lao and Chinese 
government officials. Chinese investors have aggressively created Banana plantations in Laos’ 
Northern provinces to meet an increased demand for fruit in China. The demand led to an 
increase in Chinese investment in some of the poorest Lao provinces, but in 2017 the Lao 
government created a law banning the opening of new Chinese plantations due to the unchecked 
uses of pesticides by Chinese plantation owners.
242
 The pesticides are reportedly making many 
Lao workers sick and are damaging the environment and sources of water that many Lao citizens 
depend on. Nearly all of Laotian banana exports end up in China and it is unknown how the 
government laws will affect the state’s relationship with China. The total volume of trade 
between Laos and China continues to rise.  
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Figure 10. Laos and China Trade Balances 
 The Lao-US trade relationship is not as robust as Lao-China relationship. In 2016, Laos’ 
exports to the US totaled approximately $19 million. Its main exports to the US were jewelry, 
hydrogen, men clothing products, and coffee. In 2016, the US exported approximately $30.9 
million worth of goods to Laos. Its two main exports to Laos were synthetic fabrics and 
diamonds (those two items accounted for 52% of exported goods). Laos is the 171
st
 largest 
trading partner of the United States, and the United States is Laos’ eighth largest source of 
imports.
243
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Figure 11. Laos and US Trade Balances 
The US does not maintain a military presence in Laos. During the Vietnam War, the CIA 
trained, armed, and assisted Lao guerilla fighters in its fight against communism, but the CIA or 
US military does not operate a base there currently. Over the course of the Vietnam War, the US 
performed approximately 580,000 bombing missions in Laos dropping 2.5 million tons of 
bombs. Of the 2.5 million tons of bombs, an estimated 30% never exploded.
244
 This drove 
President Obama to pledge increased efforts to remove remaining unexploded ordinances in 
Laos. The pledge, along with joint Lao-US bilateral defense dialogues, has strengthened the 
relations between the two states. The joint defense dialogues are “a forum for bilateral 
consultations between the Lao Ministry of National Defense and U.S. Pacific Command to 
strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation, as well as to develop defense cooperation 
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programs that enhance relations between our security forces, encourage greater regional military 
cooperation, and promote the common interests of both countries.”
245
 
China does not maintain a military presence in Laos. In 2016, the two states have vowed 
to increase military cooperation and increase the number of high-level military exchanges.
246
 
And in 2017, Laos received office equipment and medical assistance from China. The Chinese 
embassy in Laos presented office equipment to the Lao Ministry of Defense in April 2017. The 
Lao Deputy Minister of Defense received the equipment and suggested that it would be used to 
maintain close communications with Chinese embassy officials.
247
 Later, in August 2017, China 
deployed a 90-person medical team to Laos on a goodwill mission. The mission, called ‘Train of 
Peace 2017’, brought medicine and doctors to a makeshift 14-tent field hospital. Chinese forces 
distributed 20,000 boxes of medicine to over 6,500 patients over the 10 day mission.
248
 China 
likely uses the medical support and military cooperation to gain valuable deployment experience 
for its military forces while also improving cooperation and coordination between the two 
militaries. 
The increased cooperation between China and Laos has many questioning China’s 
motives. China may be financing large Lao projects, such as the Laosat-1 communication 
satellite or the railway, despite analysis that indicates poor economic returns on the projects.
249
 
This suggests China’s primary motivation for Lao project is not economic. Perhaps China has 
                                                          
245
 “United States – Lao People's Army Conduct Eleventh Annual Bilateral Defense Dialogue.” 2016. U.S. Embassy 
in Laos. https://la.usembassy.gov/unitedstateslaopeoplesarmyconducteleventhannualbilateraldefensedialogue/ 
(December 17, 2017). 
246
 “China, Laos agree to boost military exchanges, cooperation.” 2017. Xinhua. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/16/c_136614211.htm (December 17, 2017). 
247
 “Chinese embassy presents office equipment to Lao defense ministry.” 2017. Xinhua. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/12/c_136202934.htm (December 17, 2017). 
248
 Yang, Zi. 2017. “What is China’s PLA doing in Laos?” Asia Times. http://www.atimes.com/article/chinas-pla-
laos/ (December 17, 2017). 
249
 “China’s railway diplomacy hits the buffers.” 2017. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/9a4aab54-
624d-11e7-8814-0ac7eb84e5f1 (December 17, 2017). 
82 
 
political motivations, since a strong partnership would limit Vietnam’s future options or future 
decisions ASEAN in the South China Sea.  
Belarus 
 
Belarus and China signed the contract for the in-orbit delivery of the Belintersat-1 
COMSAT on September 18
th
, 2011. Per the contract, China would design, construct, integrate, 
test, launch, and deliver the satellite to Belarus. Additionally, China would construct the related 
ground control facilities. The contract was worth $280.9 million and also included satellite 
insurance and nine months of Belarussian satellite operator training in China. The satellite was 
China’s first satellite sale to a European country. The satellite launched January 15
th
, 2016 from 
China’s Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Southwest China’s Xichuan Province.  
China and Belarus established formal relations in 1992 and since then the two states have 
regularly exchanged high-profile state visits.
250
 In October 2010 Belarussian President Alexander 
Lukashenko said China was Belarus’s best friend and in September 2016 he awarded Chinese 
President Xi the ‘Peace and Friendship’ medal of Belarus as a sign of appreciation of China’s 
continued commitments to Belarus.
251
 One of China’s most high profile commitments in Belarus 
is the Great Stone Industrial Park, located approximately 25 km from Minsk, Belarus (the 
Belarussian capital). China touts the project as a ‘bright moment’ in the relationship between the 
two and regards the project as a key point of the Belt and Road initiative.
252
 The industrial park 
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is a result of just one of the numerous agreements signed between the two states.
253
 The 
agreements enhance cooperation in multiple areas, including investment, trade, education, and 
science. Since at least 2000, Belarus has supported the ‘One China’ policy and recognized 
Taiwan as a part of China while China has supported President Lukashenko in his contested 4
th
 
presidential election.
254
  Belarus and China’s relationship has deepened since 1992. It is likely 
that the completion of Great Stone Industrial Park and China’s Belt and Road initiative will 
make the relationship grow, as Belarus will be a European hub for Chinese goods and political 
influence.  
The details of the Belintersat-1 bidding process are unknown. According to the 
Belintersat website, “the history of the project began with a closed tender won by CGWIC.”
255
 
The participants in the Belintersat-1 bidding process were not identified in Belarussian or 
Chinese media. It is less clear who Belarus advertised the closed tender to or if China was the 
only bidder. Regardless, the satellite contract mirrored previous Chinese satellite contracts with 
other Chinese satellite customers and similar services were offered. Several clues provide insight 
into China’s involvement in the closed tender bidding process. First, the satellite deal inked in 
September 2011 occurred less than a year after China and Belarus agreed to the creation of the 
Great Stone Industrial Park. The timing of the satellite contract and the Great Stone Agreement 
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suggest the Chinese-Belarussian negotiations for each project were happening concurrently. The 
success of one was likely not tied to the other, but collectively the two very public and highly 
visible projects show significant Chinese interest in Belarus around 2010. Secondly, China 
Satellite Communications Company Ltd (China Satcom) purchased eight of Belintersat-1’s 
transponders and markets its transponders as Chinasat-15.
256
 An older, now mission-ended 
Chinese COMSAT, Chinasat-5D, previously occupied Belintersat-1’s orbital location at 51.5 
degrees East longitude.
257
 China Satcom used Chinasat-5D to provide C-band television services. 
China Satcom’s purchase of eight transponders from Belarus is a cheaper alternative than 
launching a replacement satellite for Chinasat-5D. It is unknown if China intended to purchase 
the transponders from Belarus from the onset of the satellite deal, but it is a convenient option for 
China to replace satellite telecommunication services from 51.5 degrees East. Third, Nigeria won 
the rights to provide carrier spectrum monitoring services for Belintersat-1’s African beams.
258
 
Nigeria, which also purchased a COMSAT from China, almost certainly uses similar, if not 
identical, ground equipment as the Belarussians (this is assumed since China was contracted to 
build the ground stations for each customer). While it is unknown who else bid on the closed 
tender, the timing of the satellite deal, China’s purchase of multiple transponders on the satellite, 
and a Chinese-built Nigerian ground station won the CSM contract suggest that China was part 
of an exclusive bidding process, possibly a bidding process that was just limited to China. 
Belarus used China’s Export-Import bank for project financing. 
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China is Belarus’s 9
th
 largest trading partner and accounts for 1.8% of all Belarussian 
exports. The majority of Belarussian exports are sent to Russia (48% of all exports), Ukraine 
(12% of all exports), the UK (4.7% of all exports), and other neighboring European states.
259
 In 
2016, Belarus exported a total of $22.8 billion worth of goods, of which a meager $435 million 
worth of went to China. Belarus mostly exports fertilizers, polyamides, and flax fibers to China, 
which China could almost certainly find elsewhere from other established trade relationships. On 
the other hand, Belarus imports approximately $1 billion worth of goods from China annually.
260
 
The majority of imports are transportation and machinery equipment. The trade imbalance 
generates debt on the Belarussian side and, according to the Jamestown foundation, “Minsk finds 
it difficult to compete with other Central and Eastern European countries for the status of the 
gateway to the EU. Most of those countries are already EU members or, at least, have advanced 
trading regimes with the bloc.” 
261
 Belarus could have turned to China as a trading partner 
following the drop in global oil prices or as a means to limit its economic dependency on Russia. 
Refined petroleum is Belarus’s primary export, and interestingly enough, China does not import 
any refined petroleum from Belarus. 
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Figure 12. Belarus and China Trade Balances 
 The US and Belarus do not engage in significant amounts of trade. As of 2016, the US 
imports approximately $144 million worth of goods from Belarus annually. The imports mainly 
consist of fertilizers, mineral products, and X-ray equipment.
262
 Conversely, the US only exports 
approximately $200 million worth of goods to Belarus, most of which is unspecified goods.
263
 
The US and Belarus established formal relations in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. More recently in 2015 the US and Belarus have cooperated on the release of political 
prisoners in Belarus and the US subsequently lifted sanctions on several Belarussian entities.  
Despite the lifting of those sanctions, other sanctions remain that are focused on the human rights 
situation within Belarus.
264
 The US hopes to move Belarus toward a more democratic and free 
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market society and provides monetary assistance towards Belarussian group that advocate for 
human rights and private business rights.
265
  
 
Figure 13. Belarus and US Trade Balances 
 In October 2017, the US and Belarus signed a joint agreement for bilateral military 
cooperation for the following year.
266
 It is unknown what level of cooperation the two states will 
engage in, but this marks an increase in cooperation from recent years. Analysis of historical 
cooperation between the two suggests the two states did not engage in meaningful cooperation, 
since the US had viewed military cooperation as an extension of political dialogue. Since Belarus 
was under sanction for human rights violations, the US did not make meaningful efforts to 
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engage in military cooperation.
267
 The US does not have troops stationed in Belarus but still 
maintains a robust military presence in other European states and organizations.   
In June and October 2017, China and Belarus engaged in military cooperation 
dialogues.
268
 The June talks culminated with Belarus announcing that China would be providing 
new armored vehicles to Belarus. The two states have an existing security relationship, and in the 
past China provided technical military training and military equipment to Belarus.
269
 Aside from 
military aid, it does not appear that China has held drills with Belarussian military forces or has 
announced plans to do so. China does not have any military troops stationed in Belarus to protect 
Chinese interests.  
Algeria 
 
China launched the Alcomsat-1 COMSAT for Algeria on 10 December 2017.
270
 Algeria 
entered into a contract with CGWIC to design, construct, manufacture, and launch a COMSAT 
on 17 September 2013.
271
 Limited media reporting exists on the satellite, but it is known that the 
satellite is based on China’s DFH-4 satellite bus and China launched the satellite from its 
Xinchang Space Launch Center. Alcomsat-1 will provide civil and military telecommunication 
services, such as broadcasting, telephony, and internet service, to Algerian and African users. 
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The satellite is supported by two satellite control stations and China is also training Algerian 
space operators.
272
 
China and Algeria established formal relations in December 1958. China was one of the 
first states to recognize Algeria, after they declared independence from France in September 
1958, and Algerian diplomats actively lobbied for the PRC to be restored to the United Nations 
in the 1970s (important distinction in this case since “China” had been in the UN since 1945, but 
that “China” was what we now call Taiwan).
273
 The two states have signed multiple joint 
declarations and strategic partnerships over the years to increase cooperation between the two, 
with the most recent agreement in 2014.
274
 The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed in 
2014, will reportedly usher in “a new historical stage of bilateral ties,” “deepen friendly 
exchanges between the parliaments of the two countries,” and “closely coordinate and cooperate 
with China on international and regional affairs.”
275
 The increased cooperation between the two 
is demonstrated by China’s investment in a variety of Algerian markets. As of 2016, China had 
financed infrastructure projects, including a $3.2 billion seaport in Cherchell, Algeria, housing 
developments, and vehicle and truck assembly plants. The various projects are supported by an 
estimated 35,000–40,000 Chinese workers.
276
 China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a driving force 
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behind the Chinese projects in Algeria, and it appears that China is committed to significant 
amounts of investment in Algeria going forward.
277
   
The details of the Alcomsat-1 bidding process are unknown and little information is 
provided on the Algerian Space Agency’s (ASAL) website. The lack of publically available 
information makes it difficult to determine the logics and processes Algeria used when selecting 
China as the satellite’s contractor. The ASAL website revealed Algeria’s bilateral space 
cooperation efforts. As of late 2017, ASAL has signed three government cooperation agreements 
(Argentina, France, and Ukraine) and seven memorandums of understandings for space 
cooperation (Russia, China, United Kingdom, Germany, India, Syria, and Argentina). ASAL’s 
website also says that official government agreements are also being finalized with Russia, South 
Africa, and China.
278
 The agreements would elevate the existing memorandums to formal, 
bilateral relationships. It is unknown when China and Algeria signed the memorandum of 
understanding on space cooperation, but it was at least after 2011, since China’s 2016 Space 
White Paper mentioned the Algerian memorandum as an accomplishment since its previous 
Space White Paper in 2011.
279
  
It is possible the memorandum of understanding led to China being the preferred satellite 
contractor, as was the case with the Paksat-1R satellite program, but it is unknown if this 
factored into the selection process. International Telecommunication Union documents show that 
Algeria entered into a contract with CGWIC for a COMSAT on 17 September 2013. The original 
launch date, according to the documents, was 31 January 2016. It is possible China won the 
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contract since it promised that the satellite would be launched quickly, but it seems unlikely that 
China would have been able to produce the satellite in just 2 years 4 months (based off other 
Chinese COMSAT sales timelines).
280
 The lack of media reporting regarding an Algerian 
satellite bid in 2013 suggests the process was closed to select bidders, which would be much like 
the Belintersat-1 satellite sale. If Algeria had an open bid, we would almost certainly have seen 
media reports of proposals being won or lost by various companies. Algeria awarded the contract 
to China as the two states were deepening bilateral cooperation, so it is likely the satellite 
contract factored into those conversations.  
Algerian exports a total of $29.9 billion worth of goods annually, of which only 1.1% of 
the goods is exported to China.
281
 Algeria’s largest export destinations are Italy (17%), Spain 
(13%), and the US (13%). Algeria relies heavily on petroleum products for revenue and 
petroleum, gas, and crude petroleum account for approximately 75% of Algerian exports.
282
 Of 
China’s $332 million worth of imports from Algeria, approximately 97% of the imports are 
refined petroleum and petroleum gas. It is no surprise China’s imports are predominantly 
petroleum produces, but the total volume and net worth of Chinese imports from Algeria is 
relatively low. Algeria imports approximately $7.5 billion worth of goods from China. The 
imports consist of machines, textiles, metals, and plastics and rubbers. China and Algeria agreed 
to increase trade cooperation in 2006 at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Trade between 
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the two has increased substantially from 2005, when bilateral trade was approximately $1.8 
billion.
283
  
 
Figure 14. Algeria and China Trade Balances 
The US is tied for the second largest destination for Algerian exports. In 2016, Algeria 
exported approximately $3.4 billion to the US. The exports are predominantly refined and crude 
petroleum products. Refined and crude petroleum accounts for approximately 94% of all 
Algerian exports to the US.
284
 In 2016, Algeria imported approximately $2.2 billion worth of 
goods from the US. The imports consisted of machines, vegetable products, and refined 
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petroleum.
285
 The two states have signed trade agreements and the US endorses Algerian reforms 
that would support economic diversification and economic transparency.
286
  
 
Figure 15. Algeria and US Trade Balances 
The US does not have military troops stationed in Algeria, but the two states maintain 
cooperative military relations. Since 2008, the U.S. has spent about $1 million a year to bring 
Algerian military officers to the United States for advanced military education.
287
 The US and 
Algeria established a regional intelligence-sharing center in 2010, but the organization has 
largely been described as a disappointment. A former US Africa Command general noted in 
2013 that Algerian intelligence supports US efforts against terror groups in North Africa. He 
suggested that Algeria has access to intelligence sources that the US does not, which proves 
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critical to the success of counter-terrorism operations.
288
 In April 2017, US and Algerian 
representatives met in Washington, DC for the fourth annual bilateral dialogue on security and 
combatting terrorism.
289
 The US-Algerian military relationship is mostly built upon security and 
counter-terrorism.  
China does not have a military presence in Algeria. China and Algeria have engaged in 
high-level exchanges between military officials and Algerian military officers have trained and 
studied in China.
290
 China has sold military equipment to Algeria and in May 2017 Algeria 
confirmed it was using Chinese 155 mm self-propelled howitzers. Algeria reportedly purchased 
the equipment in 2014 after signing the contract in 2013.
291
 It appears China and Algeria have 
not engaged in bilateral military exercises. It is unknown when, and if, China and Algeria will 
perform bilateral military exercises.  
Nicaragua 
 
In November 2013, Nicaragua and China signed a contract for the in-orbit delivery of the 
Nicasat-1 COMSAT. China originally planned to launch the satellite in late 2016, but it has since 
been delayed to early 2019, likely due to regulatory and financial hurdles. The satellite contract 
is worth $254 million; however media outlets have also reported the contract being worth 
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approximately $300 million or $346 million.
292
 It is unclear if Nicaragua still intends to purchase 
a COMSAT from China. Nicaragua has not released any details regarding the status of the 
satellite or given a status update on the program. Nicaragua, at the very least, had officially 
registered the satellite with the International Telecommunications Union in June 2016, and the 
license was granted in July 2016.
293
 Separately, there are reports that the Beijing based Xinwei 
Group obtained access to Nicasat-1’s orbital slot and purchased the rights to the project. Nicasat-
1 would be China’s first satellite export to a Central American state; however, the sale seems 
unlikely given the recent transactions.  
Nicaragua does not maintain formal relations with China, maintaining diplomatic 
relations instead with Taiwan. This has not deterred Chinese leaders, who have proposed several 
infrastructure and telecommunications projects in Nicaragua. The most high-profile projects are 
the proposed Nicaraguan Canal, Nicasat-1 project, and terrestrial telecommunications projects. 
The canal and telecommunications projects are reportedly the result of private investment from 
non-Chinese government affiliated organizations; however, analysts speculate that Wang Jing, 
CEO of in Beijing Xinwei, has approval from the Chinese government for the Nicaraguan 
projects.
294
 China has pledged at least $250 billion to Latin American states, many of whom do 
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not recognize China and instead maintain formal relations with Taiwan.
295
 This is likely an 
attempt to create environments in Latin American states that are receptive to future Chinese 
investment and trade goods, with the ultimate goal of swaying political recognition to China.  
Nicaragua does not appear to be moving closer to China’s orbit and instead has 
recommitted itself to Taiwan. In January 2017, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega re-affirmed 
his country’s public support for Taiwan saying “We’re still engaged in this battle, which is a just 
battle, one of principles, so that the people of Taiwan continue to be incorporated in international 
organizations attached to the United Nations.”
296
 Later, in September 2017, Nicaragua and 
Taiwan signed a defense cooperation agreement, which strengthened the bilateral relationship 
between the two.
297
 The relationship between Nicaragua and Taiwan has previously been rocky. 
Ortega broke relations with Taiwan in 1985 during Ortega’s first term as Nicaraguan president. 
Relations were restored in 1990 after Ortega left office, and when Ortega was elected to 
president again, in 2006, he retained established relations. Ortega threatened to cease formal 
relations in 2007 as a means to gain financial support from Taiwan.
298
 As one of only 20 states 
that maintain formal relations with Taiwan (following Panama’s surprise switch from formal 
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recognition of Taiwan to China in January 2017), Nicaraguan leaders contend that one of its 
most important financial partners is Taiwan.
299
   
The original satellite sale between Nicaragua and China was signed in 2013 and was 
reportedly worth $254 million.
300
 Few details exist about the contract bidding process. It is 
unknown what drove Nicaragua to select China as its satellite contractor, but Nicaragua likely 
sold the rights to the satellite project to Luxembourg Space-Flight Communications Corporation 
(LST). It is unknown when the satellite project rights were officially sold to LST but, according 
to CGWICs website, CGWIC and LST signed a contract for the in-orbit delivery of the 
LSTSAT-1 COMSAT in November 2016.
301
 LST is wholly-owned subsidiary of Beijing Xinwei 
Technology Group.
302
 Beijing Xinwei attempted to acquire Spacecom’s assets in 2016, but a 
subsequent launch failure of the Amos-6 COMSAT stalled the sale.
303
 Beijing Xinwei had 
intended to integrate its newly acquired Spacecom assets into LST. Since the Spacecom sale fell 
through, Beijing Xinwei may have targeted Nicaragua’s Nicasat-1 satellite project since Beijing 
Xinwei already had significant investment in Nicaragua’s canal project and had received rights 
to various telecommunication projects in Nicaragua. In May 2016, Chinese media reported that 
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LST obtained the rights to Nicasat-1’s orbital position.
304
 Separately, according to International 
Telecommunication Union documents, Nicaragua registered for its orbital slot in June 2016.
305
 
Beijing Xinwei, through LST, likely obtained the rights to the Nicasat-1 COMSAT project and 
intends to position the satellite, now known as LSTSAT-1, in Nicasat-1’s orbital position.
306
 This 
would position LST, and Beijing Xinwei, to provide SATCOM services to Nicaragua and the 
Americas. Beijing Xinwei could then use its satellite to support its wide variety of telecom 
services projects in Nicaragua, since Beijing Xinwei recently won six telecom licenses in 
Nicaragua. This puts Wang Jing in a unique situation. His companies own the rights to the 
Nicaraguan canal, the rights to the LSTSAT-1 COMSAT, and Xinwei’s telecom licenses in 
Nicaragua.
307
 While he suggests he is a private citizen, the amount of investment in Nicaragua 
seems to indicate that he is not acting solely on his own.
308
 Lastly, according to 
ChinaSpaceFlight, LSTSAT-1 may have adopted the DFH-5 satellite bus, which would allow for 
a larger payload and possible secondary payloads to be positioned over the Americas.
309
   
Nicaragua is the poorest state in Central America and has widespread underemployment 
and poverty.
310
 Its primary exports are textiles, insulated wire, and coffee. In 2016, Nicaragua’s 
total exports were worth $5.12 billion and only 0.66% of Nicaraguan goods went exported to 
                                                          
304
 “Xinwei Group will increase by 2.2 billion "made satellite".” 2016. CN Stock. 
http://company.cnstock.com/company/scp_dsy/tcsy_rdgs/201605/3793009.htm (December 17, 2017). 
305
 Op Cited., Calero 
306
 “Nicaragua Satellite Communications 1 (LSTSAT-1): launched in April 2019.” 2016. China Space Flight. 
https://www.chinaspaceflight.com/satellite/tongxin/Nicasat-1/Nicasat-1.html (December 17, 2017). 
307
 Ammachchi, Narayan. 2015. “Xinwei's Entry Likely to Shake Up Nicaragua's Telecoms Market.” Nearshore 
Americas. http://www.nearshoreamericas.com/xinweis-entry-shake-nicaraguas-telecom-market/ (December 17, 
2017). 
308
 Qing., Koh Gui. 2013. “Chinese businessman behind $40 billion Nicaragua canal denies special.” Reuters. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-nicaragua-canal/chinese-businessman-behind-40-billion-nicaragua-canal-
denies-special-ties-idUSBRE95O0PA20130625 (December 17, 2017). 
309
 ChinaSpaceflight. 2016. “[Nicaragua No.1] The LSTSAT-1 communications satellite purchased by Xinwei 
adopts the Dongfanghong-5 platform and was launched in 2019.” Twitter. 
https://twitter.com/cnspaceflight/status/794043407731552258 (December 17, 2017). 
310
 “The World Factbook: NICARAGUA.” 2017. Central Intelligence Agency. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html (December 17, 2017). 
99 
 
China. China’s Nicaraguan imports totaled just $17.9 million.
311
 China primarily imported wood 
products, ground nut oil and scrap copper. In 2016, China exported $624 million worth of goods 
to Nicaragua. China’s exports to Nicaragua were primarily textile products, machines, and 
metals.
312
  
 
Figure 16. Nicaragua and China Trade Balances 
The US is one of Nicaragua’s most important trading partners. In 2016, the US accounted 
for 55% of all Nicaraguan exports and 17% of Nicaraguan imports. The US exported $1.5 billion 
worth of goods to Nicaragua. The exports consisted of machines, textiles, and mineral products, 
and  imported approximately $3.4 billion.
313
 Similar to Nicaragua’s exports to China, its exports 
to the US were primarily textiles, insulated wire, gold, and coffee.
314
 US trade with Nicaragua 
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supports an estimated 9,000 jobs (as of 2015). Nicaragua and the US are both party to the 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).
315
 
The agreement strengthens cooperation between the nations and promotes regional economic 
integration.
316
   
 
 Figure 17. Nicaragua and US Trade Balances 
Neither China nor the US maintains robust military relationships with Nicaragua. In fact, 
Ortega recently signed a defense agreement with Taiwan in September 2017.
317
 Nicaragua’s 
President harbors vocal anti-US sentiment. Resentment of US foreign policies has led to public 
rebukes of US actions.
318
 As a result of the Anti-US feelings atop the Nicaraguan government 
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and the complicated history between the US and Nicaragua (read CIA operations in Nicaragua in 
the 1980s), Nicaragua and the US do not engage in military exercises. Nicaragua previously sent 
military troops to train in the US, but in 2012 President Ortega withdrew Nicaraguan 
participation from the school.
319
  
Few data points exist for Nicaraguan favorability ratings on the US or China. The most 
recent favorability data from 2014 suggests both China and the US enjoy relatively high support 
from Nicaraguans. 71% of Nicaraguans had favorable views of the US while 58% of 
Nicaraguans had favorable views of China.
320
 It is unknown if Chinese ventures in Nicaragua 
have changed the public’s perception of China for the positive or negative. There have been 
many critics of China’s canal plans in Nicaragua. Critics suggest the canal is an environmental 
risk and will supplant thousands of Nicaraguans. Supporters of the Canal, and other Chinese 
investment, welcome the foreign contribution and look forward to the long-term economic boost 
a canal would provide.
321
 It is unknown if Nicaraguan opinions towards the US have changed for 
the positive or negative. Nicaraguan political leaders harbor anti-US sentiment, so that may have 
trickled down to the general population, but that is very unlikely since Ortega has preached anti-
US sentiments for years now and Nicaraguan opinions of the US still remain high. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
 
 Analysis of the relationships between China and the purchasing states reveal telling 
insights. It appears China is motivated by a number of factors that determines which states they 
aggressively pursue as COMSAT customers. The satellite sales also likely serve immediate and 
future political goals, including supporting China’s Belt and Road initiative, gaining 
international support for the One-China policy, and proliferating Chinese satellite technology 
throughout the globe.  
 China’s meteoric economic rise in the 1990s and 2000s likely created a demand signal 
within the Chinese government for external political control and access to foreign markets. In 
each case examined, China’s imports to the purchasing state have increased and cooperation 
between the seller and recipient state actors has grown. In almost all cases, the purchasing state 
supported China’s anti-secession policies or its One-China policy. The major exception was 
Nicaragua, who recently reaffirmed its support to Taiwan in 2017. Coincidently, analysis of the 
Nicaragua satellite sale in 2018 suggests the rights to the satellite may have been sold to a 
Chinese business and Nicaraguan ownership of the project is now in question. In each case China 
Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) brokers the deals between China and the purchasing 
state. CGWIC’s objectives are political and profits are secondary, which supports the notion that 
purchasing states are targeted for political purposes and the satellite sales are likely politically 
motivated and not driven by China’s demands for natural resources – or at least crude oil.  
Some posit that Chinese foreign sales, including satellites, can be explained mostly by the 
economic imperative or the drive for resources. My data challenge this. For instance, analysis of 
the Laosat-1 COMSAT sale suggests China will not have meaningful returns on its investment. 
103 
 
Also, China exports far more than it imports from almost all of its satellite sale customers. For 
instance, Belarus exports $401 million worth of goods to China while importing $1.09 billion 
worth of Chinese goods.
322
  Nigeria, often considered a leading African exporter of oil to China, 
is dwarfed by Angola’s total oil output to China.
323
 Furthermore, China established its Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve in 2007, well after China signed its first satellite contract with Nigeria.
324
 If 
China were primarily driven by its motivation to acquire sustainable access to natural resources 
to fuel its growing economy, then it is reasonable to expect China to have initiated its Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve project about the same time it signed its Nigcomsat-1 satellite contract, not 
four years after. In other cases, China demonstrated that satellite deals are ideally announced in 
conjunction with other flagship projects (e.g. Nicaragua Canal and Great Stone Industrial Park). 
Yet, this was not the case with Nigeria. Nigeria has been the recipient of numerous Chinese 
investments, but Nigeria lacks a flagship project that was announced in conjunction with 
Nigcomsat-1 contract. Additionally, Angola is China’s largest African supplier of petroleum 
products. Angola is a developing state, rich with natural resources, and a low GDP per capita. 
These attributes suggest the state is ripe to select China to provide a satellite solution; however, 
Angola selected a Russian satellite manufacturer to design, assemble, and launch its satellite. It is 
unknown if China lost the Angola satellite bid or if it bid at all. If China were purely motivated 
to sell satellites to guarantee access to natural resources, then it can reasonably be assumed that 
China would have aggressively pursued and won the contract to provide Angola with a Chinese 
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satellite solution that could not have been beaten by a foreign competitor, given China’s reliance 
on Angola for oil and petroleum products.  
China has the ability to produce at least 10 communication satellites (COMSATs) a year 
for domestic and foreign customers.
325
 The demands for satellites have primarily been domestic 
Chinese customers, and by 2020 Chinese scientists predict that China will have supplied at least 
10% of the world’s satellites.
326
 If China wants to reach its goal, then foreign customers are 
required. China’s internal demand for satellite based telecommunication services will likely level 
out and the demand will be satisfied (as China deploys larger satellite platforms, SATCOM 
needs can be met with a fewer number of satellites), which will force China to pursue additional 
foreign customers in the coming years if China intends on reaching its 10% market share 
projection. This is consistent with lateral pressure theory. As China satisfies its own domestic 
demands for satellites and COMSATs, China will likely look for additional external customers. 
In the future, China will almost certainly market its satellite solutions and contracts to 
established commercial operators, like it recently has with Thailand’s Thaicom or Indonesia’s 
Pasifik Satelit Nusantara (PSN) in 2016 and 2017.
327
 China likely wants to compete with 
Western satellite manufacturers now, but it lacks the sustained track record of success across 
decades, thus China largely considers developing states as potential customers. An expanded 
client pool would provide China with additional political options, as China could pressure 
commercial satellite communication (SATCOM) operators to take official positions that favor 
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China’s official stances or deny SATCOM services to particular customers, namely those who 
oppose specific Chinese actions or influence.  
Chinese satellite sales blend elements of hard and soft power. Soft power, the power of 
attraction, is fueled by elements of China’s hard power. Not surprisingly, China’s satellite 
industry is bankrolled and directed by the Chinese government. The tangible economic elements 
and military utility provided by COMSATs demonstrate China’s hard power. The satellites 
supplied to the foreign customers, as discussed in this thesis, demonstrate how hard power can be 
used to achieve soft power gains. Foreign engineers are trained by Chinese engineers. China 
constructs satellite ground stations in foreign states to operate the purchased satellite. China 
transfers full control of satellites to its customers, per the contracts. The foreign state then uses 
its satellite to supposedly lift its citizens out of poverty or improve their lives. It is easy to see the 
positive effects a COMSAT can have on a state, when tele-medicine and tele-learning can 
connect rural villages to urban population centers. The hard power stimulates an increase in 
support from China’s partners, as they see its new satellite benefiting all. Satellite sales represent 
China using its hard power tools to purchase influence with each foreign partner. China also 
achieves soft power gains, as China appears more attractive following the launch of the 
purchased satellite. The purchased satellites become a source of pride and prestige and they can 
thank China. Beijing leaders, through soft power with Chinese characteristics, use hard power 
tools to achieve soft power gains in the purchasing states, as demonstrated by official support for 
China’s policies and positive public favorability ratings.  
Another likely motivation for China is the strategic imperative: they sell satellites 
strategically as a means to gain access to specific orbital positions they would not otherwise have 
access to. For instance, Laosat-1 is located directly over Southeast Asia, which is a congested 
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area in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). There are a finite amount of orbital slots, with each 
state having the ability to claim certain slots for a COMSAT. China, in the instance of Laosat-1, 
owns the rights to 50% of the satellite and the satellite occupies a Lao orbital slot.
328
 For Laos, 
they receive a COMSAT on its 40
th
 anniversary of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
329
 For 
China, they receive access to an orbital slot over Southeast Asia and rights to a satellite that 
covers a significant portion of China’s Belt and Road designated states (Chinese media 
acknowledged Laosat-1’s role in China’s Belt and Road initiative). 
330
 It should be noted that the 
Laosat-1sale is the only use to date of China owning a portion of the satellite that operates in 
another state’s orbital slot.
331
 Belintersat-1 is co-branded as Chinasat-15, but the satellite 
occupies a Chinese orbital slot.
332
 Eventually, Nicaragua is likely to have a Chinese owned 
satellite in its orbital slot, but it remains to be seen.  
China’s foreign COMSAT sales serve an additional purpose: the proliferation of Chinese 
SATCOM technology can be leveraged for use by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). If 
China’s goal is to become a global actor and expand beyond its current regional role, then China 
will need to utilize COMSATs positioned around the globe for its communication needs, much 
like the US has done for several decades. It is reasonable to expect China to prefer its own 
technology, a satellite it built, as its telecommunication provider when its military troops are 
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deployed. In 2012, the US Africa Command signed a deal to lease satellite bandwidth from a 
Chinese satellite.
333
 This was met was criticism from US lawmakers, as they deemed it a security 
threat and worked to prevent future US use of Chinese COMSATs.
334
 It is expected that China 
would respond similarly if required to use a US company-owned COMSAT and would likely 
defer to a Chinese built satellite system. As China continues to sell COMSATs to foreign 
customers, those satellites will likely be prime candidates to lease bandwidth to the PLA if the 
PLA is operating beyond the coverage area of China’s state-owned military or commercial 
COMSATs.  
Overall, China’s COMSAT sales are occurring in a time of broader space involvement 
with foreign actors. China’s 2016 space white paper suggested China would continue to leverage 
its space program abroad and would entertain deeper space-involvement with foreign states. The 
document states that “a global satellite communications and broadcasting system integrated with 
the ground communications network will be established step by step.”
 335
 As China continues to 
sell satellite to foreign states, it is possible they continue to share ownership of the satellites with 
its customers. This would likely be an easier path for China to reach its stated objective of a 
global SATCOM network. Satellite navigation (SATNAV), SATCOM, and remote-sensing 
satellites would be a cornerstone in China’s space-based Belt and Road, providing users with 
Chinese satellite technology and supporting China’s larger Belt and Road initiative. China’s 
current space involvement extends beyond Belt and Road specific states though, as China 
cooperates with African, European, and American states on a variety of space related issues. For 
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instance, in December 2017 China’s Foreign Minister met with his Venezuelan counterpart in 
Beijing and suggested the two state’s space cooperation is within the framework of China’s Belt 
and Road initiative.
336
 While COMSAT sales are unique and important, other Chinese space 
ventures are occurring elsewhere, so proper context is required to adequately portray the 
COMSAT sales. China is rapidly becoming a global space power, and COMSAT sales are just a 
piece of the larger puzzle.  
Lastly, China may be extending its hand to key states and offering telecommunication 
and infrastructure projects as a means to deliberately force reliance and debt repayment in the 
future, which China can then turn into favorable leases of land or basing rights. In December 
2017, Sri Lanka handed over its Hambantota Port to China on a 99-year lease in exchange for 
$1.1 billion of debt relief.
337
 The port is reportedly to be used only for commercial purposes only 
and China will not use the port for military activities, but it is hard to believe that will be the case 
for the duration of 99 year lease.
338
 China completed several robust infrastructure projects in Sri 
Lanka and the projects have not yielded economic returns for Sri Lanka or China, but as Sri 
Lanka continues to fall behind in payments, China may ask for additional provisions, such as 
military basing rights.
339
 China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in August 2017 
and is probably going to look for other basing option along its Maritime Silk Road and Polar Silk 
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Road.
340
 Pakistan, who also received significant Chinese funding for infrastructure projects, is 
also reportedly considering allowing China to construct multiple ports, one of which will 
reportedly have a military mission (these reports have been denied by the Chinese 
government).
341
 China’s satellite sales may play a role in China’s scheme to acquire basing rights 
abroad, as the COMSAT deals are worth upwards of $300 to $400 million a contract. Should a 
purchasing state default on its payments (as they are all are developing states with poor 
economies), China may leverage the satellite sale debt for access or control of key ports, or even 
partial or complete control of the satellite.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
The focus of this thesis was to determine why China sold communications satellite 
(COMSATs) to particular states. My original hypothesis suggested that China likely considers 
several variables when determining whether it will sell a satellite to a purchasing state. I 
proposed a number of variables, such as government type, natural resources, a state’s geographic 
location, length of formal relations with the PRC, public favorability ratings of the US and 
China, and economic rank, to establish the nature of the relationship between the purchasing 
state and China. I conducted miniature case studies for the states that had successfully purchased 
a COMSAT to determine trends or similarities between the purchasing states.  
China’s foreign policy is, in large part, driven by its pursuit of becoming a global power 
with sustained economic growth and domestic stability.
342
 As China’s power relative to others in 
the international system grows, China is afforded additional foreign policy options it previously 
did not have. A significant part of its increased power is an aerospace industry capable of 
exporting COMSATs to international customers. China’s aerospace industry and its space 
program date back to the 1950s and one of its most significant milestones was its first ever 
satellite in 1970. Early on, China recognized the importance of its space program and how it 
could be used as a political tool. Mao used China’s space program as a social stimulant and a 
tool for inspiration following China’s Great Leap Forward and the resulting famines from 1959 
to 1961.
343
  China’s first satellite, the DongFangHong-1, was derived from a Maoist saying that 
suggested the strengths of socialism were greater than the strengths of Western imperialism. The 
space program offered a source of pride for China and helped legitimize China’s ruling elite.    
                                                          
342
 Sutter, R. op. cit., pg. 27 
343
 Handberg, R. op. cit., pg 66. 
111 
 
To this day, China still uses its space program for political purposes. Space programs are 
useful for all states, but authoritarian regimes are more likely to use the space program for 
domestic gains.
344
 Unsurprisingly, China’s space program drives international cooperation, 
garners attention from the world’s leading scientists, and is a source for national pride.
345
 As of 
January 2018, China is increasingly seen as space science leader within the international 
community and China’s 2016 Space White Paper specifically mentions using its space program 
for international exchanges and cooperation, which will likely grant China more influence in 
international affairs.  
It is mankind’s unremitting pursuit to peacefully explore and utilize outer space. Standing 
at a new historical starting line, China is determined to quicken the pace of developing its space 
industry, and actively carry out international space exchanges and cooperation, so that 
achievements in space activities will serve and improve the well-being of mankind in a wider 
scope, at a deeper level and with higher standards. China will promote the lofty cause of peace 
and development together with other countries.
346
 
 
Publically, China intends on developing its space program and using it to help lift and elevate 
other states, similar to how China advertises its unprecedented economic growth. As China 
grows, the world grows; however, this model is likely self-serving, as China gains influence in 
multiple space-related forums and is granted increased options.  
Variables 
 
Initially, I had not identified a single variable that I anticipated to be a more contributing 
factor to satellite sales than others and I only posited that China was likely using satellite sales to 
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purchase influence in foreign states. After analyzing cases in which China successfully exported 
COMSATs (specifically Nigcomsat-1/-1R, Venesat-1, Paksat-1R, TKSAT-1, Laosat-1, 
Belintersat-1), the strongest evidence suggests China is most concerned about political support 
and recognition for anti-secession and one-China policies and securing markets for Chinese 
goods. At varying points in each case, the purchasing state offered public support for one-China 
or anti-secession laws that favored China. For example, the Venesat-1 satellite deal was signed 
between China and Venezuela in 2004 and then in 2005 Venezuela offered support for China’s 
anti-secession laws. And when Nicaragua wouldn’t bend to Beijing’s demands of recognition 
and reaffirmed support for Taiwan, the contract was likely then sold/awarded to a Chinese 
company.  
While China likely leverages the satellite sales for increased influence in the region, this 
objective is secondary to political support. China’s influence, through its satellite sales, manifests 
itself as both hard and soft power, granting Beijing’s leaders multiple tools and levers of power 
to help them reach their objectives of global power. It is considered hard power, since China’s 
aerospace technology is being proliferated, much like any other weapon system that is bought or 
sold. COMSATs are a tangible asset with a monetary worth that can be measured. But the sales 
can also be considered a tool within Beijing’s soft power arsenal, since COMSATs can be used 
to provide areas of scientific cooperation and they offer public services that elevate and improve 
the lives of citizens.  
China’s satellites are likely not sold with the intention of having great economic returns. 
China is almost certainly not selling satellites with the intention of generating significant sources 
of income; otherwise, China would not primarily be selling satellites to developing states. 
Developing states have pressing needs in multiple sectors and often have scarce resources. In 
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some instances, China’s foreign COMSATs were not delivered on time due to financing 
problems, as was the case with LAOSAT-1. If China were primarily motivated by financial 
gains, then we would almost certainly see China primarily signing satellite contracts with 
economically stable state’s that have the capacity to provide payments on time. Laos failed to 
provide payments on time to China and it is assumed other states, who maintain access to similar 
financial resources, would likely not be able to reliably generate the funds needed for continued 
payments. 
China uses its excess aerospace industry capacity to manufacture COMSATs for its 
customers. The sales support the Chinese space industry and give China influence in the 
purchasing state.  As described in Chapter 4, China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) is 
able to produce up to 10 COMSATs per year with its current facilities.
347
 China, likely not 
having a need for 10 new COMSATs each year, but still desiring high levels of production, 
exports its satellites to international customers and gains access to foreign markets elsewhere.  
My analysis suggests China’s leaders likely factor a state’s economic development status, 
its geographic location, and its proximity to US forces (to some degree) into its calculus when 
exporting a COMSAT. The purchasing states have developing economies and China has 
positioned itself as the champion of the developing world since the Bandung Conference in 
1955.
348
 China continues to lead developing states by providing friendly loans and all-in-one 
COMSAT solutions. In Chapter 1, I outlined China’s future ambitions and its desire to be a 
global power, and in Chapter 2, I posited that China, weary of encirclement, would attempt to 
counter US military power abroad by using satellite sales to gain footholds or military basing 
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rights in foreign states. More detailed analysis suggests that this is incorrect. While the 
opportunity exists for China to use the satellite sales as a gateway to basing rights, China has not 
demonstrated its desire to station military troops in each of its purchasing states. The only 
example of this is China possibly trying to gain basing rights in Pakistan, as some media 
reporting suggests China is considering a military base along its maritime Silk Road route, but 
that determination cannot be applied to every case examined in this study. Basing rights in 
neighboring states and abroad is probably a medium to long-term goal of China. As China bides 
its time, while building a robust economy capable of long-term sustainability, China is likely 
planning for overseas bases that align with its strategic interests.    
Contrary to my expectations, the length of formal diplomatic relations between the PRC 
and purchasing states did not appear to have any significant impact on whether a state would be 
more or less willing to purchase a Chinese COMSAT. A state’s natural resources, measured in 
crude oil production did not appear to have a significant impact on whether a state would be 
more or less willing to purchase a COMSAT from China. China, in some instances, could get 
natural resources from other states that are closer, thus reducing shipping costs. Lastly, 
government type of the purchasing state did not appear to play a major role.   
In conclusion, China positioned itself to be the leader of the developing world decades 
ago at Bandung and satellite sales are an extension of this manifestation. China is not concerned 
about financial gains, but rather influence, recognition, and external markets. Satellite sales are a 
convenient way to export influence and gain international recognition as an international space 
leader, all while presenting the illusion that it is done in support of the developing world. As 
mentioned, authoritarian regimes are more likely to use the space program for domestic gains, 
and China’s customers, such as Bolivia, Venezuela, Laos, also happen to be authoritarian 
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regimes. This is no coincidence and, for reasons outlined in this thesis, China will likely to 
continue to use its satellite contracts to gain recognition and influence in developing states in the 
future.    
Future Studies 
 
This study can be improved in a number of ways in the future. First, other variables 
should be factored into the analysis. For instance, including the number of Confucius Institutes in 
each purchasing country or a more in-depth consideration of how freedom of the press (or lack 
thereof) affects the sale and how it contributes to a state’s decision to purchase a COMSAT. 
Perhaps there is a correlation between the number of military agreements between China and the 
purchasing state and the likelihood of a COMSAT deal?  Future studies should look at natural 
resources beyond petroleum, such as precious metals. Lastly, future studies should compare the 
states under study to developed states, which have not purchased COMSATs from China. The 
additional variables and the side by side comparison would likely reveal interesting trends that 
would contribute to a more analytically sound thesis.  
Future studies could identify specific states likely to purchase Chinese satellite 
technology, based off the analyzed variables. Secondly, analyzing China’s foreign military sales 
and understanding where COMSAT sales fit into the larger picture. How has China previously 
sold its military hardware? Is China conducting its COMSAT exports the same way it has 
conducted its historical foreign military sales? Or is the COMSAT export process substantially 
different? Lastly and perhaps most importantly, examining all of China’s foreign space activity 
and understanding the extent of China’s involvement with other nations. China is very active in 
the space industry and has not just sold communication satellites, but engages in joint space-
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related projects and research with numerous foreign states. How is China using its other ventures 
in space for political gain? And do other states use space programs the same way, as in does 
Russia, the European Space Agency, or the US engage in similar behavior? Is China acting the 
same as any other emerging space power has or would? Where is China involved in other non-
COMSAT space related missions area with foreign partners? A holistic approach to China’s 
current space program, where its bilateral and multilateral relations in other mission areas (ISR, 
navigation, human space flight, lunar missions, deep space, space situational awareness) are 
analyzed, would give better perspective on China’s space intentions and its level of involvement 
elsewhere. Future studies should incorporate these suggestions into their analysis.  
Conditions for China’s Future Success 
 
In order for China to continue to market its satellites to foreign states and commercial 
SATCOM operators and expand its influence in the space domain, several conditions must be 
met. First, the CCP will continue to govern despite slowing economic growth. The CCP draws its 
legitimacy largely from China’s unprecedented economic growth. As the economy slows, the 
CCP may perceive domestic pressures for changes in regulations or leadership. This forecast 
assumes the CCP will continue to govern despite China’s slowing economic growth. Secondly, 
this assumes China will continue to support its space program and will provide adequate funding 
for research and development of new space technologies. All indications lend support to this 
assumption, as described by China’s most recent Space White Paper in 2016. As China’s space 
technology continues to mature and become more reliable, consumer confidence in Chinese 
satellites will increase, likely leading to an accelerated proliferation of Chinese satellites 
worldwide. China’s 2016 Space White Paper demonstrated China’s future commitment to its 
space program. 
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To build China into a space power in all respects, with the capabilities to make innovations 
independently, to make scientific discovery and research at the cutting edge, to promote strong 
and sustained economic and social development, to effectively and reliably guarantee national 
security, to exercise sound and efficient governance, and to carry out mutually beneficial 
international exchanges and cooperation; to have an advanced and open space science and 
technology industry, stable and reliable space infrastructure, pioneering and innovative 
professionals, and a rich and profound space spirit; to provide strong support for the realization 
of the Chinese Dream of the renewal of the Chinese nation, and make positive contributions to 
human civilization and progress.
349
 
Third, analysis in this thesis assumes that the international system remains stable. A stable 
international system, absent of great power war, will enable China to remain committed to 
economic growth and its space program. Lastly, this analysis assumes there are not drastic 
charges to US ITAR restrictions and China’s nascent commercial space industry accepts state 
regulatory regimes (as in CGWIC continues to satellite broker satellite deals with foreign states, 
regardless of China’s commercial space enterprise’s ambitions).  
Future Sales 
 
With the requisite conditions met, China will almost certainly continue to proliferate its 
COMSATs to developing states and commercial SATCOM operators, possibly to include 
western SATCOM operators, in the next twenty years.  China’s original intent with its COMSAT 
sales was to probably assist developing states in achieving a space capability and gain political 
support for sensitive issues, but as China’s space technology matures and additional satellite 
platforms are developed, such as the DFH-4S, -4E, -5, as described in Chapter 1, China will 
almost certainly attempt to expand its customer base. In just 15 years, China has exported seven 
COMSATs and signed multiple satellite contracts with regional commercial SATCOM 
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operators. China will likely build on those successes and use consumer confidence to boost its 
satellite products.  
China’s future customers will likely continue to be from all corners of the globe, but there 
will likely be an initial emphasis on Belt and Road states. This will continue to spread Chinese-
made satellites to each Africa, Europe, and throughout Asia, granting China’s military an 
indigenous SATCOM capability while deployed to use if needed. China’s military will likely 
open more overseas bases as its military power increases relative to others in the international 
system. China can use its exported satellites to augment its military dedicated COMSATs for 
communications back to Beijing, allowing it to maintain effective command and control (C2) of 
its troops. China could purchase transponder space or maintain partial ownership of the satellite, 
as part of the satellite export contract. This would ensure China’s access to the satellite’s 
services.  
Based on past COMSAT sales, I expect China will likely have exported at least 20 
COMSATs to various international and commercial customers in the next 20 years. This assumes 
several things. First, China’s current COMSAT customers choose a Chinese satellite solution to 
replace current satellite it has purchased from China, after its satellite reaches the end of its 
operational life. Secondly, this assumes the demand for SATCOM remains steady or increases. 
Third, this assumes China continues to market its satellites aggressively to foreign customers. 
And lastly, this assumes China’s DFH-4 satellite platform, and other variants, have continued 
operational success. If China’s satellites experience a rash of space-based anomalies or if China’s 
SLVs cannot guarantee access to the required orbits, then China could fall short of exporting 20 
satellites in the next 20 years. The anomalies, if dramatic or sustained, would likely lead to 
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hesitancy among international and commercial customers, since the risks for a potential satellite 
based anomaly would lead customers to selecting non-Chinese satellite manufacturers.  
It is unknown which international customers would be targeted next by China. China 
would likely pursue additional customers in South Asia, Africa, and South America. States that 
rank low in economic development, GDP, freedom of the press, and are geographically relevant 
to China’s strategic intentions would the most susceptible to Chinese targeting. The two most 
obvious customers are Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, since media reporting suggests the two states 
have already communicated with China about a potential COMSAT sale and both have valuable 
strategic positions relative to China. Other states in the Middle East or in Eastern and North 
Africa, such as Iran, would likely be highly sought after customers. A Chinese satellite sale to 
Iran would be a great strategic gain at the expense of the US, as China would be afforded more 
influence in a state that has an extremely contentious relationship with the US. States in these 
regions would allow China to position Chinese built satellites in orbital slots that could support 
the Maritime Silk Road and also combat US influence in the Middle East.  
The 20 exported COMSATs, in addition to China’s expected growth of its civil and 
military dedicated COMSATs, would demonstrate China’s growth in the SATCOM industry. 
The growth itself would attract additional new customers and China would likely be looked at as 
a leader in the SATCOM industry, potentially rivaling the US and other Western states and 
aerospace companies. The US will likely have few options to counter China’s rise as an 
aerospace leader. The US could engage with states that China is specifically targeting. By 
sponsoring an increased number educational scholarships or specialized satellite training at US 
academic institutions, hosting and participating in space-related forums designed to include 
states not typically seen as space powers, and incentivizing US satellite manufacturers to engage 
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with developing states for the delivery of space systems or hosted communications payloads, the 
US can possibly negate some of China’s increased space influence. The US must play the long 
game, much like China is, and exploit the current technological advantages it maintains over 
China, while that advantage remains. Bilateral and multilateral space engagement will not deliver 
immediate results, but over time it could help negate China’s strategic deployment of exported 
satellites, and the Chinese influence that comes with each sale. 
Importance of Space Studies 
 
 Space is becoming increasingly important in the 21
st
 century. The proliferation of space 
technology has enabled states not previously thought to be space actors to have satellites and 
other space related capabilities. The US has long maintained a technological edge in space and as 
the space domain becomes more and more crowded with actors that have diverging interests and 
objectives, understanding how it works and how it is used will be of paramount importance for 
governments and industries worldwide.  What are decision points that the US can influence? 
How can the US help shape the future of space technologies? This topic should be examined for 
other state actors, not just China, to inform US decision makers, enabling them to preserve US 
supremacy in space.  
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Appendix A 
Acronym List 
Algerian Space Agency ASAL 
Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Satellite 
Company 
APMT 
Asia-Pacific Telecommunications Company Ltd APT 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN 
Belt and Road Initiative OBOR 
Bolivian Space Agency ABE 
Central Intelligence Agency CIA 
China Academy of Space Technology CAST 
China Aerospace Science and Technology 
Corporation 
CASC 
Chinese Communist Part CCP 
China Great Wall Industry Corporation CGWIC 
China High-Resolution Earth Observation System CHEOS 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor CPEC 
China Satellite Communications Company Limited China Satcom 
Command and control C2 
Communication Satellite COMSAT 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States 
CELAC 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United 
States Free Trade Agreement 
CAFTA-DR 
DongFangHong DFH 
Geosynchronous Earth orbit GEO 
Geostationary transfer orbit GTO 
Global Positioning Service GPS 
Great Wall Industry Corporation GWIC 
High-throughput satellite HTS 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance  ISR 
International Telecommunications Union ITU 
International Traffic in Arms Regulation ITAR 
Kilometer Km 
Leading Small Group LSG 
Long March LM 
Low Earth orbit  LEO 
Luxembourg Space-Flight Communications 
Corporation 
LST 
Medium Earth orbit MEO 
Most different system MDS 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOFA 
National Space Research and Development Agency NASDRA 
Pasifik Satelit Nusantara PSN 
Pakistan Space & Upper Atmosphere Research 
Commission 
SUPARCO 
People’s Liberation Army PLA 
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People’s Republic of China  PRC 
Politburo Standing Committee PSC 
Radio Frequency RF 
Republic of China ROC 
Research and development R&D 
Satellite communication SATCOM 
Space launch vehicle SLV 
Satellite navigation SATNAV 
Strategic Petroleum Reserves SPR 
Tupac Katari TKSAT-1 
Unmanned aerial vehicle UAV 
Very Small Aperture Terminal  VSAT 
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